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Chapter 1: Why Is the Sex Ratio Unbalanced in China? The Roles of the One-Child
Policy, Underdeveloped Social Insurance, and Parental Expectations
The sex ratio imbalance in China has reached such an alarming level that, by 2020,
men of marriageable age are estimated to outnumber women by 24 million. Using a cali-
brated life-cycle model, this paper examines the rising sex ratio through three linked but
different perspectives: one-child policy, social insurance program, and parental expec-
tation. In a dynamic fertility choice framework, a couple’s decision on sex selection is
motivated by better returns from investing in a son than in a daughter. I also consider the
largely overlooked effect of expected sex imbalance on current fertility choices.
The benchmark calibration demonstrates three results. First, moving to a one-and-
half-child policy (second allowed if the first is a girl) would dramatically decrease the
sex ratio at birth from 125 to 106. Second, if parents are adaptive and take the “can-
not-marry” risk into consideration, then the sex ratio under the one-child policy will drop
from 125 to 110, while the change in population growth is negligible. Third, when social
insurance coverage is universal, the sex ratio only changes by a small amount if parents
do not modify their expectation on children’s transfer. I also investigate the equilibrium
sex ratio when couples are fully rational and forward-looking. If more couples behave in
such a manner, the sex ratio would fall; this suggests that publicity and education could
help alleviate the sex imbalance problem in China. In a similar spirit, I consider the issue
of endogenizing children’s transfer to parents. In an infinite-horizon dynastic model, the
equilibrium level of transfer is positively related to the attention parents place on grand-
parents’ welfare. Finally, I show that if social insurance could change the social attitude
on expected child transfer, then it has the potential to significantly reduce the sex ratio.
Chapter 2: Risky Child Investment, Fertility and Social Insurance in China
This paper tries to explain the decline in total fertility rate (TFR) in China by in-
vestigating the quantitative effect of social insurance on peoples’ fertility choice in an
environment where investment in children is risky. The price and income effects of social
insurance are heterogeneous depending on peoples’ position in the income distribution:
low-income people tend to raise more children due to the reinforcing income and price
effects, whereas for rich families the income effect dominates the price effect so that their
fertility declines in the presence of the social insurance program. Our results based on
Chinese economy do not support the hypothesis that increasing social insurance tax rate
has a negative impact on fertility rate, as argued in Boldrin, Nardi, and Jones (2005).
Through decomposing calibration results under hypothetical policy scenarios and simu-
lating TFRs for various parameter values, we show that liquidity constraints created by a
public pension program plays a significant role in reducing fertility rate. Factors related
to the rate of return on child investment, such as a slowing economic growth, a rise in the
cost of childbearing, and potential social attitude changes such as expectations of lower
transfers, also contribute to the long-term declining trend in fertility observed in the data.
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Chapter 1
Why Is the Sex Ratio Unbalanced in China? The Roles of the One-Child
Policy, Underdeveloped Social Insurance, and Parental Expectations
1.1 Introduction
“When a son is born,
Let him sleep on the bed,
Clothe him with fine clothes,
And give him jade to play...
When a daughter is born,
Let her sleep on the ground,
Wrap her in common wrappings,
And give broken tiles to play...”
— Taken from China’s Book of Songs1 (1100-600 B.C.)
China, with a traditional preference for boys, faces growing gender imbalance
among newborns since the 1980s: the national average was 119 in 2005, far exceeding
the United Nations’ recommendations (no more than 107); and a significant number of
cities had sex ratios higher than 125. An official estimate from China Academy of Social
1The Book of Songs is the earliest existing collection of Chinese poems and songs. It is regarded as
a revered Confucian classic, and has been studied and memorized by centuries of scholars in China. The
above excerpts are from the 189th poem titled “Si Gan”, which is recorded on Chapter 4 (Decade of Qi Fu),
Section II (XiaoYa, or Minor Odes of the Kingdom) of the Book of Songs.
1
Sciences suggests that, by 2020, there may be 24 million men of marriageable age who
will not be able to find a wife. This vast army of surplus males could lead to social in-
stability; for example, human trafficking and forced prostitution have become “rampant”
in some parts of the country. With the ticking time bomb of the sex ratio imbalance, one
would ask how did this come about, and how can China address this problem?
Son preference, as vividly shown in the ancient poem above, is always considered
as the root cause for gender imbalance. It comes from two sources: one is the cultural
aspect — males could carry family names and inherit family properties; the other is the
economic aspect — sons could provide more old-age support than daughters. Despite
this well known preference for sons that has existed in China for thousands of years,
the serious gender imbalance is only a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, even as
recently as the three decade interval from 1950 to 1980, sex ratios were only slightly
higher than the ratio of 105 male births per 100 female births that is considered to be a
normal sex ratio due to a variety of biological factors2, and is observed in many other
countries that do not have the strong cultural bias in favor of sons that China and several
other Asian countries have3. However, the sex ratio started to soar in the 1980s. The
most intuitive explanation is the enforcement of the one-child policy4, which induces
widespread abortions on female fetuses. Then our first question is: how much does this
2In reality, the natural sex ratio at birth is between 103 and 107 (on average 105), indicating a slightly
higher probability of having a son, where the higher probability of having a baby boy is used to compensate
the higher infant mortality risk for males so that the sex ratio evens out in adult population.
3In the 1953 China population census, sex ratio at age 0 was 104.9 boys per 100 girls. According to Ma
et al. (1998), average sex ratio at age 0 was 106.9 in the 1950s, 107. 5 between 1960 and 1969, and 106.0
in the 1970s.
4China’s one-child policy was established in 1978 and the enforcement remains strong as of 2008.
However, this birth control policy is a diversified program in that although urban residents can only have
one child; many rural couples are allowed a second kid if the first is a girl; ethnic minority couples are
allowed to have two or more children; and no restrictions in Tibet. The latest revision is that couples in
which both partners are single children may be allowed to have two.
2
state-mandated family control policy contribute to the sex imbalance?
With respect to motives for childbearing, old-age support is often mentioned, and
social insurance program is cited to help reduce both population growth and sex im-
balance. In particular, China has made some progress in the development of its social
insurance system since 1993; however, the increasing trend in the sex ratio did not stop
or slow down after China officially launched this program. So, our second question is:
what is the role of social insurance in a couple’s fertility decision and how does it affect
the society-wide sex ratio?
Last but not least, the recent trends in the sex ratio since 2000 seem to indicate a
new pattern, i.e. the sex ratio has remained at alarmingly high level, between 120 and
125. Numerous news reports5, both in China and abroad, have expressed concerns that
with such a high imbalance, marriage markets in 20 years will be extremely unfavorable
to boys. Then this brings about our third question: is parental expectation in terms of con-
cerns on the marriage prospect for sons able to reduce the sex ratio? This is a challenging
issue since it involves policy debates on whether China should reform its family planning
policy, and social-economic concerns on whether such a high sex ratio is permanent or
transitory. Here, we consider the possibility that people recognize the “can-not-marry”
risk for sons and expect lower support from unmarried sons, and we use our model to
study how this parental expectation change would affect fertility choices and the sex ra-
tio.
To answer all these questions, one needs to understand how much of the current sex
5For example, in July 2010, People’s Daily (the official newspaper of China’s central government) had
an article titled “Brides for Sales: Sex Ratio Imbalance Troubles China” discussing a series of problems
related to the severe gender imbalance among young Chinese. BBC News had a similar article featuring
“Wifeless Future for China’s Men” as early as in February 2007.
3
imbalance is due to the one-child policy; if relaxation could help alleviate the problem, to
what extent the policy should be relaxed; and the direction and magnitude of social insur-
ance’s impact. What’s more, given the pros and cons of the above two, whether changes in
parental expectation could be helpful in easing the unbalanced gender structure. All these
involve a great deal of variations in the policy environments couples face when making
fertility choices. Since it is hard to impose nationwide experiments to determine whether
a reform is effective or not, we calibrate an individual decision making model to address
this issue from various aspects and to shed some light on these intriguing questions.
We develop a tractable life-cycle model that captures couples’ decisions regarding
(1) whether or not to have children; (2) if the sex of a fetus is a girl, whether to abort in
order to try again for a boy; (3) depending on the birth quota, whether to have a second
child; and (4) if a second kid is allowed, whether to terminate a girl pregnancy on the
second child as well. Along with these fertility choices, couples also make optimal deci-
sions on consumption, transfer to their elderly parents, and personal savings. One major
feature of our model is that investment in children is costly (measured by money and
time), while the return on this investment is subject to several risks (child mortality risk,
adult “can-not-marry” risk, and adult transfer uncertainty). These decisions are modeled
encompassing three different dimensions: (1) whether the one-child policy is enforced,
(2) whether social insurance coverage is available, and (3) whether parents are forward-
looking with respect to their sons’ marriage prospects. The third dimension in our model
is the key ingredient of the reverse effect of the sex ratio on fertility choices: if couples
rationally expect that a high sex imbalance will dash their sons’ chances of marriage in
the future and reduce their expected transfers from unmarried sons, then their preferences
4
and choices over sons and daughters may change.
Our integrated model allows us to investigate the potential causes of the gender
imbalance problem and to understand possible outcomes from different policy experi-
ments. As predicted, moving from a stringent one-child policy to a one-and-half-child
policy (second allowed if the first is a girl) would dramatically decrease the sex ratio at
birth. The impact of social insurance is more complicated in that it involves four different
channels (income effect, price effect, liquidity constraints, and social attitude changes).
At this moment without the change in social attitudes, its overall magnitude is limited
as compared to that of the family control policy. However, when parents are forward-
looking and take into account the “can-not-marry” risk for sons, the sex ratio declines
significantly without a noticeable increase in the total fertility rate. This suggests that
changes in parental expectation may alleviate the sex imbalance problem and simulta-
neously avoid a higher population growth, concerns over which are precisely why the
Chinese government are resistant to reforming the controversial family planning policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background in-
formation on the one-child policy and the social insurance program, and discuss the sig-
nificance of this sex ratio imbalance issue for China. Section 3 describes the dynamic
fertility choice framework with utility maximization for couples. Section 4 presents the
main model results and evaluates the model’s goodness of fit by comparing actual versus
simulated sex ratios. We illustrate how the one-child policy, the social insurance program,
and parental expectation affect agents heterogeneously. And we examine how our model
can be used to evaluate counterfactual policy experiments. For example, we show that an
increase in the sex selection cost such as strengthening the supervision on non-medical
5
abortions would result in a significantly lower sex ratio. Section 5 provides three ex-
tensions to the benchmark framework. First, we consider the scenario when parents are
fully rational and forward-looking, and compare the steady state to the current sex ratio.
Second, we endogenize children’s transfer behavior by deriving an equilibrium transfer
distribution in an infinite-horizon framework. Finally, we discuss additional channels
through which social insurance can affect fertility decisions and show that if the intro-
duction of social insurance program changes the social attitudes on child transfer, then it
could significantly affect the sex ratio. We offer concluding remarks in Section 6.
1.2 Background and Significance
This study is inspired by Sen (1990), who draws attention to an important fact of
life in East and South Asia: a biased sex ratio at birth and males outnumbering females. In
China, India and South Korea, gender imbalance has become a longstanding problem due
to various human interventions, from sex selective abortions to neglect or even infanticide
as seen in the substantial female child mortality as discussed, for example, in the March 6,
2010 issue of the Economist magazine. The fundamental reason for this sex ratio imbal-
ance is the persistent son preference6 in these countries. There are two separate, though
not independent, causes for this preference. First, these countries share strong similarities
in their rigidly patrilineal kinship system, which lies at the root of discrimination against
daughters (see Das Gupta et al. (2003)). Second, economic factors including old-age sup-
port, dowries, labor force participation, etc., may account, to various degrees, for the son
6Actually, Williamson (1976) argued that most societies show some degree of preference for sons,
though most are so mild as to be virtually undetectable.
6
preference7.
Among all these countries, China deserves a special attention: it is the country with
the biggest population, and it faces the most severe gender imbalance. More importantly,
the imbalance of sex structure recorded in the past three decades is not only a demo-
graphic problem, but also an issue affecting every aspect of the society such as population
size, aging, a wifeless future and social stability. Under the state-mandated one-child pol-
icy, China’s total fertility rate remains low resulting in an increasing proportion of elderly
people in the society. Meanwhile, the abnormally high sex ratio will lead to a “marriage
squeeze” for young adult males, with predictions of as many as 24 million men of mar-
riageable age not able to find a wife by 2020. As argued in Wei and Zhang (2011), in
order to increase the attractiveness of sons in the marriage market, Chinese parents have
strong biological motivation to save, which may contribute to the high saving rate and the
soaring housing prices in China. Moreover, these surplus males often play a crucial role
in making violence prevalent within the society and thus harm social stability. Edlund, et
al. (2007) document the relationship between sex imbalance and the increase in the crime
rate in China.
Previous literature focuses on two major aspects in explaining China’s gender im-
balance: family planning regulation associated with sex-selective abortions, and underde-
veloped social insurance. First, the one-child policy narrows peoples’ fertility choice set
and stimulates couples to find ways to satisfy their son preference. Ultrasound technology
provides a means to do sex-selective abortions at a reasonable cost. Using a difference-
7For example, Qian (2008) claims that increasing female income, holding male income constant, im-
proves survival rates for girls and increases educational attainment of all children. Rao (1993) and Ander-
son (2003; 2007) discuss the inflation of dowry payments, brideprice, and female power in India.
7
in-differences method, Li et al. (2010) conclude that the one-child policy has resulted
in around 7.0 extra boys per 100 girls for the 1991-2005 birth cohort and accounts for
between 54% and 57% of the total increase in sex ratio for the 1990s and the 2001-
2005 birth cohorts. On a related subject, Li and Zheng (2009) try to directly measure
the causal effect of sex selective abortions on the sex ratio at birth by exploiting the ex-
ogenous county-level variation in the availability of ultrasound machines. They find that
such availability increases the sex ratio at birth by 0.025 in rural and 0.117 in urban areas.
Second, social insurance could arguably ameliorate the differing old-age support from
sons and daughters: a generous pension benefit could substitute part of a son’s role8. For
example, Ebenstein and Leung (2010) show that people who have sons are less likely to
enroll in voluntary social insurance program, and the sex ratio is mitigated in counties
with old-age pension programs. By the same token, Bhattacharjya, et al. (2008) argue
that policies involving economic benefit (such as pension plans for families with no sons)
could decrease the difference between the perceived present value of sons and daughters,
and thereby reduce the sex ratio.
Few of these empirical studies have taken an integrated structural approach to
consider different factors simultaneously. In addition, the difference-in-differences and
“treatment effects” methods used in any reduced form studies cannot accurately reflect
the complexity and uncertainty facing heterogeneous individual decision makers; nor do
they capture the critical dynamic elements of fertility choices. Moreover, it is very hard
to predict how new, hypothetical policy changes might affect outcomes in the future us-
8The sex ratio in South Korea reached its peak value of 117 in the 1990s. As of 2008, it had dropped
to a close-to-normal level of 107 and anecdotal evidence indicates that a series of reforms to social security
was partially responsible for this drop in sex ratios.
8
ing a reduced form methodology. In providing guidance for policy makers, it is critical
to be able to predict the consequences of hypothetical counterfactual policy experiments.
Therefore, in this paper, we will apply a structural framework to analyze individual opti-
mal choices and forecast their responses to a wide range of policy changes, such as relax-
ing the one-child policy, strengthening regulations on sex-selective abortions, promoting
social insurance to rural areas, and educating the general public that girls are equally good
as boys.
Figure 1.1: China Sex Ratio (1976-2008) and Social Insurance Coverage (1993-2008)
Figure 1.1 describes China’s sex ratio history since 1976. Clearly, sex ratio began
to increase after the enforcement of the family control policy in the late 1970s; this in-
creasing tendency seems to have halted recently, but the sex ratio for the age 0-4 group
remains around 120 with some fluctuations; and the future trend appears unclear at this
moment9. We also display the social insurance coverage rate from 1993 onwards, which
9Das Gupta et al. (2009) argues that in China, the provinces which had the highest sex ratios (and have
two-thirds of China’s population) have seen a deceleration in their ratios since 2000, and provinces with
9
is calculated as the number of people having old-age pension coverage10 divided by the
total population aged 15 and above. Although social insurance is still underdeveloped in
China, people covered under this system almost doubled from 1993 to 2008. However,
the increases in the sex ratio and in the social insurance coverage rate seem to be parallel
to each other, which could suggest that social insurance may not have a significant impact
on the sex imbalance.
We also look at the sex ratio by ethnic groups and socioeconomic development for
year 2000 in Table 1.1. A comparison between Han Chinese and other ethnic groups gives
us a rough idea of the effect of the one-child policy. Han Chinese, accounting for over
90% population, had higher sex ratios (119 nationwide) than the minority groups (112
nationwide), who are exempt from the one-child regulation. Another clear observation
is that sex ratio was lower in cities than in towns and villages. But the reasons behind
this phenomenon are not that apparent. One possibility is that cities have relatively better
developed social insurance programs. However, if this were true, we should observe
(in Figure 1.1) a slowing in the increase in sex ratio since 1993 when the program was
introduced; but we do not. This suggests that lack of social insurance coverage may not be
the main force pushing up sex ratios in rural areas. In addition to social insurance, rural
and urban areas are different in several other aspects as well, which could potentially
contribute to the observed differences in sex ratios. Abortion is cheaper and regulation of
illegal sex-selective abortions is weaker in rural areas than in urban areas. Young adult
a quarter of the population have seen their ratios fall. This, at the very least, seems to be an incipient
turnaround of the “missing girls” phenomenon.
10China’s social insurance system has four parts: the old-age pension program, health insurance, unem-
ployment insurance, and maternity insurance. The latter three are less developed than the first one and cover
much fewer people. Therefore, our calculation should give an upper bound for social insurance coverage
rate.
10
males may be more valuable for farm work than females and they have a higher potential
income (for instance, they can migrate to a city), enlarging the difference in rewards
between sons and daughters for rural families. Housing prices in cities are less affordable
and it is a social custom for a bride’s parents to buy a house for the marriage, decreasing
the parents’ motivation for sex selection, etc.
Table 1.1: Sex Ratios by Ethnic Groups and Socioeconomic Development in 2000
Nationwide City Town Village
Han Chinese (91.9% of total population) 119 113 118 120
Other 55 Ethnic Groups (8.1% of total population) 112 108 112 113
Note: Sex ratio (boys/girls) at age 0 is calculated using the summary statistics of population by age,
sex, and nationality of the 2000 population census.
Source: 2003 China Population Statistics Yearbook.
Inspired by the potential effect of housing prices on fertility choices and numerous
news reports on the millions of surplus males facing a wifeless future, we investigate a
largely overlooked area: the (reverse) effect of the sex imbalance on couples’ fertility
choices. One can imagine a marriage market in 20 years, in which some males can not
find wives because of the sex imbalance. Their transfers to their parents may be lower
than if they can marry, which suggests that daughters should be at a premium and bring
more rewards to parents. If Chinese parents are aware of the environment of excess boys
and treat it in a serious manner, they should rationally react to the current sex ratio so that
the high imbalance would only be a short-term phenomenon. However, this has not hap-
pened in reality and a partial justification could be that Chinese parents haven’t realized
the ensuing tight marriage market for sons, or some couples may have biased interpre-
tations (for example, they may be over-confident of their son’s chance of marriage). To
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consider this channel, we incorporate explicitly how parental expectation on future trans-
fers are formed via an individual optimization model. We will consider three types of
expectations: myopic, adaptive, and completely forward-looking, and see how parental
expectations move the sex ratio.
1.3 The Model
The key feature of our theoretical framework is a macro aggregation based on mi-
cro optimization. Specifically, we consider agents with heterogeneous budget constraints,
solve their individual optimization in a partial equilibrium framework, then aggregate in-
dividual fertility choices to obtain the society-wide sex ratio. This is different from a
typical representative agent problem in a general equilibrium framework such as Boldrin
and Jones (2002). In such a general equilibrium framework, the rule for optimal behavior
is the same across periods and there is no uncertainty in child transfer11 from the par-
ents’ viewpoint. In addition, since the representative agent is assumed to represent the
whole society, his decisions could affect the society outcome, with wage and interest rate
endogenously determined. However, our framework is micro-founded in that agents in
this framework are heterogeneous, since we do not assume that the aggregate behavior of
11There is an abundant literature studying the direction of intergenerational family transfers, the under-
lying motives, and the supporting institutional and cultural arrangements, represented by Caldwell (1978;
1982), Willis (1982), etc. Consistent with Caldwell’s “old-age security” hypothesis, Boldrin and Jones
(2002) model the fertility choices that children are investment goods to parents and the desired number of
children depends on the amount the child transfers to elderly parents in relation to the cost of rearing their
child to adulthood. This is contrary to the work of Barro and Becker (1988; 1989) in which the utility
of children enters directly into the utility function of the parents, indicating the reason for childbearing is
that children are viewed as life continuity for parents. Although we focus on the choice between sons and
daughters instead of the optimal number of children, we adopt a framework similar to Boldrin and Jones
(2002) to reflect the son preference as better returns from investing in a son than in a daughter in terms of
the expected future transfers.
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millions of heterogeneous families can be well approximated by the behavior of a single
‘representative consumer’. The population outcomes are from a direct aggregation of in-
dividual choices, where we assume that wage rate and interest rate are exogenously given.
More importantly, in this partial equilibrium framework, parents are uncertain about the
old-age transfers they can expect to receive from their children, so they need to form
expectations on how they will be distributed.
Instead of focusing on endogenous economic growth and fertility transitions, I cal-
ibrate the model based on optimal decisions solved in a partial equilibrium framework to
emphasize the heterogeneous feature of peoples’ reactions to homogenous policy envi-
ronments (either social insurance or the family planning policy). Under this framework,
an individual’s decision could not have impacts on the aggregate outcomes, but the aggre-
gation of individual decisions can affect individual choices via individual expectations.
Thus, this is the advantage of introducing heterogeneous agents in the micro-aggregation,
and it may produce more realistic results.
In detail, we present a dynamic fertility choice model in a dynamic programming
framework. The main fertility decisions are: (1) whether to have child(ren) or not, (2) if
have children and if the screening shows it is a girl, whether to abort or not, (3) depending
on the birth quota defined by the family control policy, whether to have a second kid,
and so on. Payoff at each terminal decision node is determined by an individual utility
maximization on consumption, transfer and saving, with the fertility choice at that node
taken as given.
Although Ebenstein (2011) presents a similar fertility choice framework12, there
12Ebenstein (2011) assumes parents have access to a priced sex selection technology, but they have to
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are some notable differences: (1) we endogenize the payoff of having children by solv-
ing a three-period life-cycle model, covering individual’s investment in children, transfer
to elderly parents, consumption and saving; (2) we introduce social insurance in a way
that alters peoples’ expectation on the return from child investment, as well as affect-
ing their intertemporal budget constraints; (3) we consider three versions of the family
planning policy: one-child, one-and-half-child (second allowed if the first is a girl), and
full-fledged two-child policy; (4) aside from the normally considered mortality risk in
child investment, we incorporate a “can-not-marry” risk for sons reflecting the reverse
effect of the sex imbalance on fertility choices; (5) the heterogeneity in fertility choices
with respect to income is assessed, so the distortion of the sex ratio is different depending
on peoples’ income position. We also allow the “double-income-no-kid” (DINK) phe-
nomenon, which may be optimal for certain type of individuals given their preference
and budget constraints.
Overall, our structural model spans three dimensions: variations in the family con-
trol policy; the presence of social insurance; and incorporating a son’s “can-not-marry”
risk into the parents’ child investment consideration.
1.3.1 Structural Framework under One-Child Policy
The dynamic decision making process is presented as a decision tree in Figure 1.2.
Using backward induction, we solve the maximization problem for the following sce-
narios: (1) one-boy with sex selection; (2) one-girl; (3) one-boy, (4) no-children. By
pay a fine in order to have a second birth. He also considers a three-child decision problem to explore the
possible outcomes by relaxing the one-child policy.
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comparing the expected life-time utility under different scenarios, parents make optimal
fertility choices as well as optimal consumption, transfer and saving choices at each deci-
sion node. We solve this individual decision making problem for everyone in the society,
and then aggregate individual fertility choices into a society-wide sex ratio.
To simplify our calculation, we assume parents have equal probability (i.e. 50%) of
having a boy or a girl so that if nobody choose to do sex selection, the sex ratio will be
100. However, given that the natural sex ratio at birth is between 103 and 107 (on average
105), we must be careful in explaining our simulated sex ratio and realize that we need to
adjust our results upwards13 in order to compare with actual data.
Decision 1: To have children?
No Children Expected utility onward






Figure 1.2: Decision Tree under a One-Child Policy
According to Figure 1.2, we implicitly assume that the enforcement of the one-
child policy is perfect so that if the incoming baby is a girl, parents can only choose to
13There are two ways to adjust. Since the natural sex ratio at birth in our framework is 100, while it is
105 (on average) in reality, the absolute difference is 5 and the relative difference is 5%. If our simulated
sex ratio equals 120, one way is to add 5 directly which arrives at 125; the other way is to increase our
results by 5% which is 126(=120× 1.05). We adopt the second way when measuring the model’s goodness
of fit in section 1.4.5.
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do sex selection to try to have a boy, but can not or are not allowed to pay fines to have
a second (or even a third) child. We admit that this assumption seems to be away from
reality and we do observe families pay fines for violating the policy in order to have more
than one kid. However, considering imperfect enforcement of the family control policy
will complicate our dynamic fertility choice process and make it hard to have a clear
understanding of the effect of the family control policy on sex ratio. Suppose the one-child
policy is not perfectly enforced so that parents can pay fines to have a second kid, then
the difference in sex ratio between one-child and one-and-half-child scenarios does not
indicate the exact impact of relaxing the one-child policy; instead it reflects a combined
effect of imposing fines and relaxing the policy. In reality, if the local authority has
weak enforcement penalty for violating the policy, we could imagine that the magnitude
of relaxing the one-child policy will be significantly under-estimated by comparing sex
ratios across different areas. Thus, as a simplification, we assume that the family control
policy is perfectly enforced.
On life-cycle dynamics, we assume that individuals can live three periods: young,
middle-age, and old. Young individuals simply consume parents’ resources to grow up.
When becoming middle-aged, they supply one unit of labor, obtain income (Wt)14 and
make optimal decisions on fertility, consumption (Cmt ), transfer to their elderly parents
(dt) and saving (st).
The cost of rearing children consists of two parts: a fixed cost (a) and an income-
14Here is the notation rule: lower-case letters usually represent the percentage or ratio, while upper-case
represent the absolute level. For example, W t is the society-wide average income level, Wt,i is the income
for individual i, and the corresponding relative income is wt,i = Wt,i/W t. Similarly, st,i represents the
private saving rate for individual i, while St,i = st,iWt,i is his/her private saving amount. For ease of
notation, we omit the subscript i.
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varying cost. When there is no social insurance coverage, the time cost of rearing one
child is simply bWt; when social insurance is present, it will be discounted by tax rate
(αt), which becomes (1− αt)bWt. That is, the opportunity cost of raising a child instead
of working decreases because people need to pay social insurance taxes. Correspondingly,
the income by providing one unit of labor drops fromWt to (1−αt)Wt. In a similar spirit,
the cost of sex selection also contains two parts: a fixed cost (c) and an income-varying
cost (φWt). Here, we assume that the child-care expenses are tax-deductible, but the cost
of sex selection is not. On expected transfers next period (Dt+1), we decompose it as:
dt+1wt+1W t+1, where we assume the transfer rate dt+1 follows a Beta distribution15 and
children’s relative income wt+1 is log-normally distributed16. When individuals become
old, they will retire and finance their consumption by the transfer from children, private
savings from previous period17 and social insurance benefits if they are covered by the
program.
We first present a representative scenario, and then show that other scenarios can be
accommodated as special cases. The typical model of “One-boy with sex selection, social
insurance and adaptive parents” scenario is:
15Beta distribution is a family of continuous probability distributions defined on the interval (0, 1) and
parameterized by two positive shape parameters, typically denoted by α and β. This Beta distribution
assumption guarantees that the transfer rate is always within the (0, 1) region.
16This assumption ensures that the relative income is positive, and the median income is smaller than the
mean, as consistent with empirical income distributions.
17ft−1 and st−1 are two state variables, indicating the number of children and private saving rate of the
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Assuming a logarithmic utility function and after algebraic manipulations of eq. (1.7) and
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(1.9)
Thus, the solution is characterized by an equation on st, LHS(st) = RHS(st), and we use



































x, βx) , dyt+1 ∼ Beta(α
y, βy)
Et[dyt+1] = λEt[dxt+1] , Var(d
y
t+1) = λ
2Var(dxt+1) , 0 < λ < 1
log(wt+1) ∼ N (µ, σ2)
The RHS could be simplified as follows if we construct a discrete approximation to
the product of Beta and lognormal distributions18.
18Given two independent random variables X and Y , the distribution of Z = XY is a product distribu-










where pX,Y (x, y) is the joint probability density function. Here, dt+1 and wt+1 are assumed to be statis-
tically independent so pX,Y (x, y) = pX(x)pY (y). Hence, we can derive the distribution of dt+1wt+1 and
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fX(x)dx (1.12)
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The key source of risk in this model is the intergenerational transfer amount, which
is decomposed into two factors: the transfer rate (which is affected by the social attitudes,
etc, but will also be some kind of optimal choice when the kids grow up) and the relative
income (which is related to parents’ human capital investment). We assume that boys
and girls differ in the distribution of their transfer rate, but not in that of their relative
incomes19 (i.e. dt+1,boy ∼ Beta(αb, βb) and dt+1,girl ∼ Beta(αg, βg)). In addition, two
other risks are also involved: (1) mortality risk denoted as p, which is introduced to ensure
that parents driven by precautionary saving motives, always have a positive net asset; (2)
“can-not-marry” risk, which is to model different types of parental expectations, such as
myopic, adaptive, and completely forward-looking. Here we denote the probability of
“can-not-marry” as m, which is positively related to the cohort-wide sex ratio; if a son
cannot get married, we assume that his income will not be affected by his marriage status,
19To avoid further complication, we omit the gender discrimination in the labor market.
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but he will transfer, on average, a smaller percentage of his income to his elderly parents.
That is, unmarried sons’ transfer rate still follows a Beta distribution, with the mean being
λEt[dt+1,boy] and variance being λ2Var(dt+1,boy), where 0 < λ < 1; Et[dt+1,boy] and
Var(dt+1,boy) are the corresponding mean and variance of the transfer rate distribution for
those married sons.
Let’s look at the parental expectation scenarios further: the completely myopic (or
over-confident) scenario implies that m = 0; the adaptive scenario implies that m is
derived from the current sex ratio as m = ρ(1 − 100κ ), where sex ratio κ is denoted as
number of boys per 100 girls and ρ represents some adjustment accounting for cross-
cohort marriage, immigration, emigration, etc; and completely forward-looking means
there should be an equilibrium level κ∗ such that the sex ratio from parents optimally
choosing fertility matches with the ex ante expected sex ratio in the mind of these parents.
Details on deriving the equilibrium sex ratio are provided in section 1.5.1.
Introducing social insurance does not change much of the model. Social insurance
serves as a mandatory saving mechanism, with the rate of return depending on individ-
ual’s income position; given that the Chinese income distribution is highly skewed to the
right (median smaller than mean), it is expected that most people may benefit from this
program. Moreover since part of the childcare-related expenses is tax-exempt, everyone
should see their childbearing cost (i.e. the income-varying part) lower than that with-
out social insurance. So the income and price effects mean that social insurance should
induce most people (except for those with very high income) to have more kids, but its
effect on sex ratio is uncertain.
Finally, let’s look at some sub-models: (1) “One-girl”: we need to set (c, φ) =
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(0, 0), and pick up the corresponding (αg, βg); (2) “One-boy”: we need to set (c, φ) =
(0, 0); (3) “No-kid”: we need to set (a, b, p) = (0, 0, 1) and (c, φ) = (0, 0), and an
analytical solution happens to exist.
1.3.2 Structural Framework under Two-Child Policy
In some areas of China parents can have a second kid only if the first one is a girl,
or if they face an economic hardship (which is termed as one-and-half-child policy, as
shown in Figure 1.3); while in other areas or for minority people, the birth quota is two,
which is shown in Figure 1.4.
Although the two-child policy results in a slightly complicated decision process,
the structure of the process can be summarized as a four-step decision tree. First, parents
decide whether to have children; second, for those who find the first kid is going to be a
girl, they need to choose whether to engage in sex selection; third, parents decide whether
they will have a second child; fourth, those who decide to have a second child and realize
the second one is going to be a girl need to decide if they will abort this girl.
Before proceeding, we would like to discuss one subtle question: whether the strat-
egy of “abort-and-reconceive-until-a-boy” could be applied for the second time. As seen
from Figure 1.4, in one decision route parents abort the first girl until having a boy, then
decide to have a second kid and find it is going to be a girl again. At this moment, these
parents may have the option to take abortions again until a second boy is coming. How-
ever, we eliminate this option for them because (1) nobody can have an unlimited number
of conceptions and abortions in their lifetime, (2) the price (both fixed and time cost)
22
Decision 1: To have children?
No Children Expected utility onward
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Figure 1.4: Decision Tree under a Two-Child Policy
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of applying the sex selection technology for the second time may be much higher than
for the first time, and (3) after trying several times to get the first boy, the probability of
successful “abort-and-reconceive” will decrease dramatically. Therefore, we impose the
minor restriction that for those who arrive at this decision node, it is a one-shot decision
that they have to accept whatever the nature’s choice is.
Now we need to solve the individual optimization problem for five additional sce-
narios: (1) two boys with sex selection; (2) one boy and one girl with sex selection; (3)
two boys; (4) one boy and one girl; and (5) two girls. First, let’s look at the representa-
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)
Rt (1.18)
The solution procedure for this model is quite similar to the one-child case and we
present the details in Appendix 1.7.2. Now, let’s look at other variants which are slightly
simpler. Basically, the version without social insurance will be that (α, β, γ) = (0, 0, 0);
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the one without sex selection will be that (c, φ) = (0, 0); the one involving girls, like “one
boy and one girl” and “two girls”, will be that (α, β) = (αg, βg) and (mg, λg) = (0, 0).
1.4 Model Results
1.4.1 Parameter Choices
Our benchmark calibration aims to show the direction and magnitude of the three
factors in the benchmark year. Throughout the calibration, we assume that a period is
20 years which may be a bit away from the realistic “40-years-working and 20-years-
retirement,” but is helpful to choose the benchmark year. As seen in Figure 1.1, the sex
ratio increased dramatically during the period 1980-2000, while it seemed to stabilize at a
high level after 2000. On the one hand, China’s social insurance programs were launched
around 1993. The reforms of these programs in urban areas mostly took place in early
2000s; expanding it to rural areas is a more recent development. On the other hand, the
family control policy was not a heated topic in 2005, but policy makers and researchers
intensively debated the pros and cons of relaxing the policy starting in 2009. For both
reasons, year 2005 might be regarded as a year without dramatic social insurance and
family planning policy changes. Details on the benchmark parameters are presented in
Appendix 1.7.3. Here we provide formal justifications for those benchmark parameters
related to child investment.
First, childbearing cost consists of a fixed cost (a) and an income-varying cost
(bWt). We assume a is around 5% of average income, i.e. one-year’s average income,
and set b as 10%. Providing support for our assumptions, Echevarria and Merlo (1999)
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find that the cost to a woman of having a child is about 5% of her working lifetime. Juster
and Stafford (1991) find that hours per week allocated on childcare account for between
6.43% and 18% of parents total available time. In China, children are heavily dependent
on their parents’ support. In addition, we make no distinction between boys and girls on
childbearing cost, and we assume that raising two children will double the cost, without
considering any economies of scales.
Second, sex selection cost consists of a fixed cost (c) and an income-varying cost
(φWt). This price reflects the expectation of the accumulative cost of having a series of
girl abortions until a boy is coming. Costs not directly related to one’s income such as
the screening test and surgery fees are captured in the fixed part. Since several abortions
might be needed in order to conceive a boy, we assume that the fixed cost equals one-
year’s average income. However, we simplify the income-varying cost. (1) For each
conception, couples need to wait for at least 4 months to know the gender of the baby. (2)
If a couple decides to abort, the woman needs time to recover before they can have another
try: we assume that the recovering time is 3 months. This is a moderate assumption and
we admit that some only wait for 1 or 2 months, while others wait much longer. (3) The
probability of consecutively having girls is decreasing as a geometric series: the chance
that the first try is a girl equals 1
2
, the first two are girls equals 1
4
, the first three are girls
equals 1
8
, and so on. (4) A woman can have at most 4 abortions in her life. Given that time
cost for one abortion is 7 months (4 months on waiting for screening and 3 months for









Roughly speaking, a couple expects to commit 12 months to have a boy, hence we assume
φ = 0.05.
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Third, we assume that children’s transfer rate follows a Beta distribution and relative
income is log-normally distributed. The distribution of transfer rate from boys and girls
will reflect the “high risk high return, low risk low return” property. This is intuitive
because the economic aspect of son preference is that sons can provide more financial
support to elderly parents, while daughters, after getting married, normally will not live
with their parents and hence provide less support. However, transfer from sons might be
affected more by other factors and be more volatile. Therefore, we assume Et[dt+1,boy] >
Et[dt+1,girl] and Var(dt+1,boy) > Var(dt+1,girl)20.
Last but not least, relevant for families who take the “can-not-marry” risk into con-
sideration, the transfer rate from an unmarried son is still Beta distributed, but with a mean
discounted by 25% of that of his married peers. Such discounting could be justified that if
a male can not marry, he will not have children to support himself in his own retirement.
Rationally this single male needs to save more for himself and transfer less to his parents,
other things equal. Correspondingly, the variance of single male’s transfer rate equals
0.752Var(dt+1,married boy) so that the coefficient of variation is the same between married
and unmarried sons.
1.4.2 Benchmark Calibration
In our benchmark models, parents are characterized by three dimensions of hetero-
geneity: their own income Wt,i, their parents’ (i.e. grandparents in our model) income
20Here we assign values for the transfer parameters in an exogenous way. This can be improved in two
ways. One is to do sensitivity analysis on these parameterizations. The other is to endogenize the transfer
distribution so that the prior expected transfer distribution coincides with the actual distribution of optimal
transfers from parents. We pursue the second route in Section 1.5.2.
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Wt−1,j , and the expected income distributions of their kidsWt+1,k. First, for every (i, j, k)
pair, we solve the individual maximization model for each terminal scenario, like the “two
boy with sex selection, social insurance and myopic parents”. Second, for each combi-
nation of (i, j, k), by comparing the maximal utility at each decision node, we obtain the
optimal fertility, saving, and transfer choices. Third, we aggregate the individual fertility
choices over dimension k, then over j and finally over i, which leads to a society-wide
sex ratio, corresponding to a particular setting like “one-child policy with social insurance
and myopic parents”.
While there is no confusion on weighting schemes for i and j (the empirical dis-
tribution of own and parents’ income), the weighting scheme for k is a bit complicated:
basically we employ a Markov transition matrix from the parents’ income position to the
(expected) children’s income position. To simplify, we assume that the grid points in chil-
dren’s income distribution are the same as the parents’, and parents could attach different
probability combinations to these grid points. We consider two possible ways to construct
the transition matrix. The first one is that all parents have an identical expectation on the
income distribution of their children, which is the same as that for the current parents’
generation (denoted as the Raw matrix). The second one is that parents’ expectations on
children’s income are correlated with their own income position (denoted as Adj matrix).
Intuitively, a millionaire should use a weighting scheme that put a higher probability on
the high income percentile rather than the probability from the empirical society-wide
income distribution. We conjecture that the Raw weighting matrix will provide a lower
bound on the simulated sex ratio, while the Adj version will provide an upper bound.
Table 1.2 reports the calibrated sex ratio in the society, in which columns labeled
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Table 1.2: Calibrated Society-Wide Sex Ratio
Myopic Adaptive
Raw Adj Raw Adj
SI-No
One-Child 113.7 135.6 104.0 115.3
One-N-Half-Child 102.5 108.8 100.8 103.9
Two-Child 103.1 112.9 100.6 102.9
SI-Yes
One-Child 119.4 147.7 105.2 117.8
One-N-Half-Child 102.6 109.0 100.8 104.0
Two-Child 104.4 115.5 101.9 109.2
as Raw and Adj correspond to the two different weighting schemes on expected kids’
income. Several important observations stand out.
First, relaxing the one-child policy will significantly alleviate the sex imbalance,
which is consistent regardless of the presence of a social insurance program and parental
expectations. Basically, giving some or all parents a second chance will ease their inten-
tion of distorting the sex ratio of the first birth; most of those who choose sex selection
under the one-child policy, will now wait until the second child to engage in sex selection.
As discussed above, the values using Raw and Adj weighting schemes may correspond to
the lower and upper bound of the simulated society-wide sex ratio, their average under
the one-child policy for myopic parents without social insurance is around 125, which de-
creases to 106 under the one-and-half-child policy. On the comparison between one-and-
half-child and two-child policy, the difference in sex ratio is not dramatic. The underlying
explanation is quite subtle, and the key is to understand the behavior of those parents, who
already have a son and now are allowed to have a second child. On the one hand, some of
them may choose to do sex selection on the second birth; on the other hand, they should
have a smaller incentive to distort the sex ratio of the second birth than those parents who
29
already have a daughter21.
Second, the impact of social insurance on the sex ratio is a bit surprising: when
social insurance is present, the sex ratio increases under every policy environment. The
magnitude of the increase is limited under the one-and-half- and two-child policy, but
is moderate in the one-child case. Due to the price and income effect, social insurance
taxes make child care cheaper, and pension benefits increase the life-time income for
the majority of people. However, we also acknowledge that there are two additional
unconsidered channels. The first one is a liquidity constraint. Social insurance might
decrease a couple’s current cash-on-hand, even if it raises their life-time income, under
the implicit assumption that the financial market is incomplete and people can not borrow
against their pension benefits. The second is that we assume parents haven’t taken into
account the possible social attitude change that their kids may not transfer as much as
otherwise. We suspect that these two channels have worked at this moment, given that
social insurance is still underdeveloped, but we will explore these two issues explicitly in
section 1.5.3.
Third, when parental expectation shifts from myopic to adaptive, it also helps re-
duce the sex ratio. For example, under the one-child policy without social insurance, the
average of the simulated sex ratios using Raw and Adj weighting schemes falls from 125
for myopic parents to 110 for adaptive parents. The direction of this effect is consistent
21Suppose among the first birth, the total number of kids is w1 and the percentage of boys is z1; and the
corresponding variables are (wg, zg) among the second birth whose first birth is a girl, and (wb, zb) whose
first birth is a boy. Then the percentage of boys among all newborns under the one-and-half-child policy is
(w1z1+wgzg)/(w1+wg), and that under the two-child policy is (w1z1+wgzg +wbzb)/(w1+wg +wb).
One can show that whether two-child policy is better than one-and-half-child version depends on whether
zb is smaller than (w1z1 + wgzg)/(w1 + wg). Since the constraint we have is 100 ' z1 ≤ zb ≤ zg , which
is weaker than the above condition, it is hard for us to predict which policy is better.
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with our conjecture and the magnitude is significant across all scenarios. When parents
take into account the “can-not-marry” risk and the correspondingly lower transfer from
unmarried sons, as an investment vehicle sons are not as attractive as otherwise and par-
ents will adjust their fertility choices. It might be the case that some couples at the margin
of choosing sex selection, would choose not to invest in such a less rewarding asset. Thus
we see fewer distortions and a better sex ratio.
Last, as expected the Adj weighting matrix generate a higher aggregated society-
wide sex ratio. This fact indicates that, other things equal, high income people, with
prospects of having rich children, are more likely to do sex selection and distort the gender
balance. Thus when heavier weights are applied on such prospects, we will see a more
unbalanced sex ratio.
1.4.3 Heterogeneity with respect to Parents’ Income
The benchmark calibration gives us an overall idea on how the three factors could
possibly affect parents’ fertility choices. However, it is natural that their impacts could
differ from person to person. In this section, we will focus on the effect of parents’ in-
come on fertility choice by looking at sex ratios for each income subgroup. Everything
here is similar to the benchmark case, expect that the sex ratio within a given level of par-
ents’ income is a statistic by taking the aggregation over the dimensions of grandparents’
(Wt−1,j) and expectation on children’s income (Wt+1,k).
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1.4.3.1 The Relationship between Sex Ratio and Parents’ Income
Figure 1.10 shows how the sex ratio changes with respect to parents’ income. How-
ever, at first sight, the result seems unintuitive that the figure lacks a consistent pattern:
there is neither a monotonic nor an inverted U-shaped relationship. For example, one
could spot several sharp up-and-downs from the red line in Figure 1.10(a): the sex ratio
first increases from 100 to 300 when parents’ income rises from 1.1W t to 2.5W t, then
declines to 160 for those who earn [2.6, 3.3]W t, but later goes back to 300 when the in-
come reaches 3.4W t, and further becomes infinity (i.e. all boys and no girls) for parents
earning [4.9, 5.7]W t. These jumps cast doubt on our model and solution. Below using the
one-child policy as an example, we explain these seemingly strange results and show that
there is in fact a very good intuition behind it: namely, a declining TFR and an inverted
U-shaped sex selection decision are jointly responsible.
First, let’s recall that in the decision tree under one-child policy (Figure 1.2), any
distortions in the sex ratio come from the possibility that some parents decide to abort
the incoming girl. And their optimal decision depends on the comparison of maximal
life-time utility from “keep the girl” (i.e. “1Girl”) and from “abort the girl until a boy is
coming” (i.e. “1BoySex”).
Figure 1.5 shows for a given combination of Wt−1,j and Wt+1,k, the maximal utility
when parents keep the incoming girl (the dashed line) and when they pay sex selection
cost to have a boy (the plain line)22. Two points can be made here. First, although the
22For illustrative purposes, we choose j = 8 and k = 8. The solution of the model shows that, with an
expectation of higher children’s income, given childbearing cost and children’s transfer rate, the gap in the
rate of return between boy and girl investment enlarges and boys become more attractive to parents. If we
instead choose a smaller k (i.e. children’s income are distributed around a lower percentile), we will see that


















Figure 1.5: Maximal Utility: 1BoySex v.s. 1Girl
fertility choices are discrete and we solve the model for a grid of Wt,i, the (linearly)
interpolated maximal utility for either decision is well behaved: it is increasing, concave
and continuous in parents’ income. This suggests that the numerical solution of the model
is correct. Second, since the plain and the dashed lines are very close in Figure 1.5, we
look at their difference in Figure 1.6, which is also continuous. When parents’ earning is
between W#1 and W#2, aborting the incoming girl is a better choice than keeping her.
This is again in line with the intuition that only those who are neither too poor nor too
rich can afford both the fixed and income-varying costs of sex selection.
Second, although imbalances in the sex ratio come solely from parents’ decisions
at the second decision node, one must also look at how many people could possibly arrive
at that node, because some parents may simply decide not to have children. Figure 1.7
shows the maximal utility between having and not having children, and is of similar shape
to Figure 1.5. In terms of making optimal decisions at the first decision node, the key is to
compare the plain and the dashed lines. In Figure 1.7(a), given an expectation of a higher
boys are not that attractive.
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Figure 1.6: Maximal Utility Difference Between 1BoySex and 1Girl Decisions
children’s income, the maximal utility of having a child is always larger than that of not
having, although the gap diminishes as income rises. While in Figure 1.7(b), if parents
are less optimistic, it is optimal to have children only for those with earnings less than
W#. The existence of a threshold level of income in this example, is consistent with the
declining TFR as income rises.
Have Children
No Children




















(b) j = 8, k = 5
Figure 1.7: Maximal Utility: Whether to Have Children
Third, the simulated sex ratio by parents’ income is an aggregated ratio over two
dimensions: income of grandparents (Wt−1,j) and of children (Wt+1,k). Its value is af-
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fected by how many parents decide to have a child and how many of them choose to do
sex selection when facing an incoming girl. In Figure 1.8, we show a disproportionate
sex selection pattern, which is the driving force for the up-and-downs of the sex ratio.
Sex Selection-No
Sex Selection-Yes










Figure 1.8: Disproportionate Sex Selection Pattern
We assume that for parents at each income level, there are 8 possible incomes for
their elderly parents, and 8 possible expectations on the income of their children, thus we
denote that there are 64 types of parents at a given income level, differing in their Wt−1,j
and expectation ofWt+1,k. So, the dashed gray line in Figure 1.8 is a horizontal line at 64,
i.e. the maximal possible number of children within each income group. The height of
each rectangle represents how many of the 64 types of parents at a given income position
decide to have a child. There are two parts in the rectangle: arriving at the second decision
node, the height of the green part indicates the number of parent-types who will not abort
the girl, and that of the red shows the number of those who will. On the one hand, with
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the rise in Wt,i, fewer types of parents choose to have a child, i.e. a declining TFR. On
the other hand, the relationship between the number of parents choosing sex selection and
income is inverted U-shaped, as is similar to that in Figure 1.6.
More importantly, Figure 1.8 serves as an intermediate step to compute the sex
ratio. Suppose among the total 64 types of parents for each income group, Z types of
parents decide to have a child. If all of them are facing an incoming girl, X types of
parents (the height of the red part) will do sex selection and the remaining Z − X (the
height of the green part) will not. Given the nature’s choice, the total number of boys born
























= 1 + 2Z
X
−1 . It is clear that both the number
of parents who choose to have a child and that who choose to abort the girl affect the sex
ratio; in fact, sex ratio is increasing in X/Z.
A more intuitive story is in place. We treat the set consisting of 64 types of parents
at a give income level as a bottle. There are three materials inside the bottle: air which
refers to those types of parents who decide not to have a child; soil which represents
those who decide to have a child and will abort the girl if nature leads them to the second
decision node, and water which denotes those who choose to keep the girl. Sex ratio
then can be interpreted as the soil concentration in the solution. First, air does not affect
the cleanness of the solution, just like those not having children contribute nothing to the
unbalanced sex ratio. Second, the size of the solution approximates the total number of
parents who decide to have a child, i.e. Z. Third, soil directly affects how muddy the
23For illustrative purposes, the following is an unweighted simplification. In our baseline calibration, we
also weight the contribution of each j and k by their proportions in the income distribution.
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solution is, and this closely resembles the following: sex selection behavior determines to
what extent the sex ratio is distorted. Since the soil concentration could be computed as
X/Z, it is not surprising to realize that sex ratio is positively related to X/Z.
Therefore, changes in the size of solution and soil help explain the up-and-downs
in the sex ratio. Several cases are possible. (1) Sex ratio stays constant because the sizes
of both do not change. (2) If sex ratio rises, then either we have more soil or less solution
or both. For example, the rise of sex ratio when Wt,i increases from 1.2W t to 1.3W t
is because more people say “Yes” to sex selection while the total size of solution does
not change. However, the rise in sex ratio when Wt,i moves from 2.3W t to 2.4W t is a
different story: the size of soil does not change, but some water at 2.3W t now evaporates
into the air). (3) Sex ratios become less biased thanks to a smaller size of soil such as
when Wt,i changes from 2.5W t to 2.6W t.
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Figure 1.9: Extra Boys from Sex Selection
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Finally, another angle is to look at the extra boys from sex selection, i.e. the gap
between the red and the green line in Figure 1.9. Here, the black line is the total number
of children born; the dashed green line indicates if nobody choose to do sex selection, the
balanced number of boys within each income group; and the red line shows the actual
number of boys. For some income groups, the red and the green lines coincide with each
other, which means nobody say “Yes” to sex selection and the sex ratio is balanced. But
for most income groups, the red line is above the green line, indicating extra boys born
by aborting incoming girls. It is obvious that the magnitude of the differences between
these two lines depends on the position of Wt,i. We can then calculate sex ratio directly
by dividing the height of the red line by the gap between the red and the black lines.
To sum up, our two fundamental intuitions are correct that (1) TFR is a decreasing
function of parents’ income, and (2) in face of an incoming girl, the number of parents
engaging in sex selection will first increase and then decrease as income rises. In other
words, we have Z as a decreasing function and X as an inverted-U function of Wt,i, so it
is natural that X
Z
would be neither a decreasing nor an inverted-U function of Wt,i. Since
sex ratio is an increasing function of X
Z
, we in turn see a not-so-well-behaved pattern of
sex ratio as income rises.
1.4.3.2 Heterogeneous Impacts of the Three Factors
We now compare the sex ratio by income group under various scenarios and the
results are shown in Figure 1.10. First, although the overall magnitude of relaxing the
one-child policy is significant, people are not equally affected. Under the scenario that
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parents are myopic and not covered by the social insurance program (as shown in Figure
1.10(a)), those at the lower (≤ 1.1W t) and higher (≥ 5.8W t) end of income distribution
have no response to the hypothetical policy changes, because both types of people will not
choose sex selection and thus the sex ratio of children from them is always 100. However,
myopic parents with income between 1.2 and 5.7 times the average level, who can afford
both the fixed and the income-varying parts of the sex selection cost, are affected most
by the policy change. Even within this income range, the impacts of relaxing the policy
are heterogeneous: the magnitude becomes larger when people earns more. For example,
for parents earning 4.8 to 5.7 times the average, the sex ratio is simply infinite under
one-child policy, which indicates that they will continue to “abort-and-reconceive” until
a boy is coming, regardless of any cost considerations, while it declines dramatically to
200 under the one-and-half-child policy. For parents earning 1.6 to 1.8 times the average,
the sex ratio drops from 200 to 118 if they could have a second child if the first is a girl,
which is a relatively small amount compared to the previous example.
Second, the limited effect of social insurance on the sex ratio is confirmed by this
heterogeneity analysis. Figure 1.10(b) is an example to illustrate this under the one-
and-half-child policy for myopic parents. It is quite clear that only people at particular
borderline incomes are affected. Basically social insurance brings two effects: a smaller
childbearing cost for everyone (price effect), and a higher life-time income for the poor
but a lower one for the rich (income effect). Although we do not assume a tax-deduction
in sex selection cost, the enforcing price and income effects for the poor imply that their
childbearing and sex selection motives will be strengthened, and whether sex ratio will
rise or decline depends on which of the two motives grows faster. For the very rich, the
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case is that the income effect dominates the price effect, so sex ratio changes for them are
determined by relative reductions in both motives.
Third, a shift in parental expectation affects a much broader range of people: as long
as parents distort their fertility choices, taking into account the “can-not-marry” risk could
help correct their distortions to various degrees. For instance, for myopic parents under
the two-child policy environment (as shown in Figure 1.10(c)), almost all parents within
the income range [1.5, 5.7]W t change their decisions on sex selection if they realize the
“can-not-marry” risk. The most striking changes are for couples with earnings between
4.9W t and 5.5W t, who without recognizing the “can-not-marry” risk for sons, have huge
incentive to abort, causing an extremely abnormal sex ratio (700). However, these people
will not distort their fertility choices at all if they expect a difficult time for sons to find
wives.
1.4.4 Sensitivity with respect to Sex Selection Price
Our structural model is designed to explain the fertility choices under the assump-
tion that children are a type of investment vehicle, thus those parameters measuring the
investment cost and return play a key role in explaining our qualitative and quantitative
results. Investment cost involves sex selection price (c + φWt) and childbearing price
(a + bWt); meanwhile the return side is reflected as the expected transfer in the future.
Here we focus on the sex selection price, which affects peoples’ choices on whether to
“abort-and-reconceive,” and hence the sex ratio directly24.




The fixed cost of childbearing reflects the total cash needed in a series of abortions
and re-conceptions until a baby boy is coming; and the main component may be the ul-
trasound detection and surgery expenses. We set the benchmark as 0.05W t (one year’s
average income), and then double and half the cost (i.e. 6 months’ or 2 years’ average
income). The simulated sex ratios are reported in Table 1.8 and the cross-sectional differ-
ences in the response are represented in Figure 1.11.
Several observations are worth mentioning. First, the sex ratio is strongly nega-
tively correlated with the fixed cost. When c rises from 6 months’ average income to 24
months’, the sex ratio drops dramatically, especially for myopic parents. Second, peoples’
responses to the change in c are heterogeneous. Some dramatically adjust their choices:
for example, under the one-and-half-child policy without social insurance, myopic par-
ents earning 5W t end up with an abnormally high sex ratio (200) when c equals 6 months’
average income; while the same couples will have a normal sex ratio when c rises to 2W t.
Third, when the fixed cost equals 2 years’ average income, almost everyone in the soci-
ety will consider this price tag to be extremely expensive and not intervene the nature’s
choices. Suppose the annual average income is $50,000, then “24 months” means that the
expected medical cost, associated with repeated ultrasound detections and abortions, is
$100,000, which is indeed prohibitive, and perhaps even the richest may not adopt such
strategy.
The third observation has particular implications for policy makers in an effort to
re-balance the sex structure. Relaxing the one-child policy could alleviate the imbalance,
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but the side-effect is that TFR will increase simultaneously. In the meanwhile, we see that
social insurance’s influence is quite limited. In light of these observations, one solution
is to raise the fixed cost for abortions. Although the official regulation claims that non-
medical-related abortion is illegal, the enforcement is weak and sex-selective abortions
are quite common with low ultrasound and surgery charges, especially in less developed
areas. If the government could strengthen their monitoring and impose fines for violation
(i.e. a way to increase the fixed cost of sex selection), China would see a re-balancing
process of its sex composition. To sum up, a penalty along with a strict enforcement
could stop most people from choosing sex selection. However, we also admit that this is
equivalent to using exogenous forces to alter peoples’ budget constraint and it is always
easier easier said than done. A more desirable policy should influence individual’s pref-
erence or expectation, so that couples’ optimal decisions coincide with social planner’s
objectives, without much intensive monitoring from the government side.
1.4.4.2 Income-Varying Cost
This part reflects the accumulated time involved in a series of abortions and re-
conceptions and we set the benchmark as 12 months (φ = 0.05), with the justification
in section 1.4.1. The simulated society-wide sex ratios are reported in Table 1.9. Since
φWt affects the child investment return in a negative way, we also observe a significantly
negative correlation between the income-varying cost and sex ratio. For myopic parents,
when φ increases from 12 months to 15 months, we observe a close-to-normal sex ratio in
every case except the one-child case using Adj weighting matrix, which indicates a rather
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powerful channel.
We also notice the difference in cross-sectional distribution of such effect, which
is displayed in Figure 1.12: when the income-varying cost increases, the sex ratio drops
more for high-income couples, but remains unchanged for low-income ones. The under-
lying reason is straightforward: since this cost is proportional to one’s income, the rich
will feel the price pressure more. For example, parents earning 5W t, with c moving from
9 months to 15 months, see their fixed part expense as a share of their income increases
from 0.75% to 1.25%; and when φ rises from 9 months to 15 months, their income-
varying expense jumps from 3.75% to 6.25%, a larger price hike. However, for parents
earning 0.5W t, with the same change in c and φ (9 months to 15 months), the fixed part
will rise from 7.5% to 12.5%, which is larger in both absolute and relative terms; while
the change in income-varying part remains the same (3.75% to 6.25%).
As a summary, the sensitivity exercise shows that: the calibrated sex ratio are sen-
sitive to changes in sex selection cost, especially in the one-child case; and across the
section, the poor are affected more by the fixed part, while the rich by the income-varying
cost instead.
1.4.5 Discussion on Model Fitting
Based on analysis so far, we know that there are various dimensions of heterogene-
ity such as policy environment, parents’ income, sex selection cost and so on, that can
have impacts on the aggregated sex ratio. Given that all these dimensions can change
simultaneously in real life, to see if our theoretical model could produce a close match
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with actual sex ratios, we need to make sure variations in all these dimensions are taken
into account in a sensible way.
We first describe how the empirical statistics look like, then discuss potential con-
tributing factors, and demonstrate the correspondence between the actual and simulated
fertility outcomes.
1.4.5.1 Data
Our population census samples span three census years (1982, 1990, and 2000),
which provide a unique opportunity to assess the time-series and cross-sectional responses
of fertility outcomes to changes along several dimensions including the family-control
policy, social insurance coverage, sex selection and childbearing costs, and so on. The
three columns labeled by “Actual” in Table 1.3 reports the actual sex ratios of different
socioeconomic groups from the three census years25.
We use individual’s response on ethnicity to identify whether a person is an ethnic
minority. Although China has 56 official recognized ethnic groups, the family planning
policy does not differ much among those who are not Han Chinese, and thus we group
them as “minorities”. Meanwhile, due to data limitation, the rural and urban classification
is less clear. The regulation stipulates that whether a couple can have a second child
depends on their hukou26 status: people with agriculture hukou are under the one-and-
half-child or two-child policy, and people with non-agricultural hukou are subject to the
25There is a slight discrepancy in 2000 data between this table and Table 1.1, where the summary statistics
are based on full census sample.
26In China, every household is required to register in the residence registration system, which was offi-
cially promulgated by the government in the 1950s to control the movement of people between urban and
rural areas. A hukou (i.e. a household registration record) identifies a person as a resident of an area and
includes identifying information such as name, parents, spouse, and date of birth
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one-child limit. So we use the hukou status to identify rural and urban residents27.
Table 1.3: Actual versus Simulated Sex Ratio
1982 1990 2000
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
Overall 107.9 108.7 113.0 113.0 120.4 123.0
Han 108.4 108.9 113.7 113.6 121.8 123.7
Minorities 102.8 105.0 107.9 106.1 111.6 115.0
Rural 107.8 108.9 113.0 112.6 125.0 125.7
Rural Han 108.4 109.1 113.7 113.2 126.4 126.5
Rural Minorities 103.0 105.0 107.2 106.4 117.1 117.3
Urban 108.1 108.0 113.6 113.9 117.1 118.3
Urban Han 108.3 108.2 113.4 114.7 118.8 119.0
Urban Minorities 101.2 105.0 116.8‡ 105.0 100.0‡ 110.9
Note: These two statistics may be subject to small sample errors. A reasonable estimate for
the Urban Minorities should be 107 in 1990 and 110 in 2000.
Source: China population census in 1982 (1% sample), 1990 (1%), and 2000 (0.1%).
Several patterns of actual fertility outcomes are worth noting. First, there is a clearly
increasing tendency of sex ratio from 1982 to 2000. The overall sex ratio rises from the
close to normal level (107.9) in 1982 to an abnormally high level (120.4) in 2000. This
trend is consistent across all subgroups, with the biggest increase (16.6% increase) among
Han Chinese living in rural areas. Second, sex ratios for Han Chinese are significantly
higher than that for minorities and the gap between the two has widened as time goes
on. This observation is consistent with the fact that minorities were exempt from the
family control regulations, but more Han Chinese faced strict fertility limits from 1982 to
27Hukou information is not available in our 1982 sample, so we use a person’s living place (whether in
a city or in a prefecture) as a proxy. Furthermore, one minor issue with the 1990 sample is that we find
around 20% newborns with missing hukou status. This might be due to a temporal revenue-generating
policy around that period, which allowed rural residents to pay “fees” to transfer their (and their children’s)
hukou type. Given the advantages of holding a non-agriculture hukou on housing, education, employment,
health care, and so on, relatively rich rural people had great incentives to make such a transition. However,
the whole process took a long time. Those newborns without a clear hukou type were most likely in such a
transition process, and hence we classify them as rural residents.
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2000. Third, although the sex ratios in rural and urban areas are quite close in both 1982
and 1990, it became more unbalanced in rural areas in 2000, implying some underlying
changes having taken place during this period. Finally, the higher sex ratio for Han Chi-
nese than for minorities is consistent in both rural and urban areas, and the similarity and
discrepancy in the sex ratio between rural and urban areas remain the same across both
ethnic groups.
There is a need for some explanation on sex ratios of minorities living in urban ar-
eas. Calculated from our census samples, the sex ratios for urban minorities were not that
reasonable: 116. 8 in 1990 but 100 in 2000. The might be due to the small sample size.
Given the similarity in sex ratio between rural and urban areas in our 1990 census sample,
we think the actual sex ratio should be around 107 for urban minorities in 1990. For the
2000 urban minorities, we take the average of that in cities (108) and in towns (112) as in
Table 1.1, since cities and towns are more close to urban areas. These adjustments may
also imply that compared to the full census sample, values reported in Table 1.3 were
slightly higher in 1990 and lower in 2000.
1.4.5.2 Contributing Factors in the Cross Section and Over Time
Variations in a number of factors contribute significantly to the pattern of sex ratio
as we see in Table 1.3. And we classify them into two types. The first type includes
factors that only change their values over time but not across different population groups.
One example is the fixed cost for childbearing, which rises dramatically from the early
1980s to 2000. China nowadays has a below-replacement TFR of 1.8, which can not be
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contributed by the birth quota. Instead, it is due to a rising proportion of urban couples
who postpone their childbearing plan and rural parents who decide to only have one child
even if they are allowed to have two. A more reasonable justification is the rising child-
bearing cost, which makes children too expensive to bear. To incorporate this variation,
we assume that the fixed cost for raising one child equals 6 months average income in
1982, 12 months in 1990, and 18 months in 2000. Other factors that change over time
include the social insurance program, which was not in place in the 1982 and 1990 cen-
sus; the one-child policy, which was at its early stage of implementation in 1982, but
became stricter in 1990 and 2000; and the fixed cost of sex selection, which becomes
more affordable with the diffusion of ultrasound machines over time.
The second type includes factors that differ across groups. On the one hand, rural
and urban areas are divided in many aspects. (1) In year 1982, the one-child policy just
became effective for a few years. We assume rural residents were not affected, while
only 50% of urban population were regulated by the quota. In 1990, we assume that 90%
urban residents were limited by the one-child quota. And in 2000, all Han Chinese living
in urban areas had to obey the regulation. Things are different for rural residents in that
mothers of a daughter in several rural provinces are allowed to have a second child (i.e.
the one-and-half-child policy), and families in remote areas can have two or even three
children regardless of the gender of the first one. According to Ebenstein (2011), nowa-
days the fertility policy imposes a one-and-half-child limit on most rural residents, who
account for around 54% of the total population, and a two-child limit (10% population)
for remote provinces. We then assume that in 1990 and 2000, 84% (i.e. 54%
54%+10%
) of the
rural population were subject to the one-and-half-child policy, and the remaining were al-
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lowed to have two children. (2) We assume social insurance coverage was available only
for urban residents in 2000. (3) Rural families have historically stronger son preference
because sons can provide more help on farm work and are more likely to live with their
parents after getting married. Thus, we assume that the mean of the transfer rate from
adult sons to their elderly parents are higher in rural areas than that in urban areas. (4)
The fixed cost of sex selection, which reflects the total cash needed in a series of abor-
tion and re-conceptions, also differs between rural and urban areas. When the ultrasound
machines were not widespread, it was more expensive for rural residents to conduct ultra-
sound detection. However, with the diffusion of ultrasound machines, rural couples have
much easier access to the sex selection technology and the cost becomes cheaper in rural
than in urban areas.
On the other hand, the difference between Han Chinese and minorities is more
straightforward. Minorities are excluded from the birth limit. In addition, in rural areas,
the gap in old-age support between sons and daughters might be smaller for minorities
than for Han Chinese because most minorities live in a small and relatively closed com-
munity and inter-ethnicity marriage is not common so that daughters after getting married
still live in the same region and thus can provide more help to their parents28.
1.4.5.3 Model Fitting
Our primary objective is to match the sex ratios for four basic subgroups (i.e. Han
Chinese and minorities in rural and urban areas) since sex ratios for other larger groups
28It is also possible that the son preference among minorities is weaker because minorities have their own
culture and are not affected much by the Confucianism.
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are population-weighted average of these four. For each of the four subgroups and for
each census year, we first decide which factors need to be turned on and their associated
magnitudes. Then, under each parameter and policy setting, we calibrate our model in
the same way as described in the benchmark calibration29. Since for certain years, some
subgroups contain two policy environments such as 84% Han Chinese in rural areas were
subjected to the one-and-half-child limit and 16% were allowed to have two in the 2000
census, we will use the weighted average of the simulated sex ratios to represent the entire
subgroup. In addition, in order to calibrate sex ratio corresponding to each census year,
we also update our assumptions on real interest rate, GDP growth rate, and the two state
variables. After obtaining the simulated sex ratio for the four subgroups, we calculate
their weighted average for the Han Chinese/minorities groups, for rural/urban groups,
and for the overall population, where the weights are the actual population shares in the
2006 China Statistics Yearbook.
The three columns labeled by “Simulated” in Table 1.3 display outcomes from our
model. Overall, our simulated sex ratios are very close to the actual ones: for the four
basic subgroups, except for Han Chinese living in urban areas in 1990, the discrepancies
between actual and simulated sex ratios are smaller than 0.8. More importantly, we also
successfully match the actual fertility patterns that the sex ratio increased from 1982 to
2000, Han Chinese had a consistently higher sex ratio than minorities, and sex ratio for
29As discussed in the benchmark calibration, there are two ways to aggregate over expected children’s
income: one is that parents with heterogeneous income have identical expectation on children’s income (i.e.
Raw weighting matrix); the other is that parents’ expectation on children’s income is positively correlated
with their own income position (i.e. Adj weighting matrix). The values using Raw and Adj weighting
schemes may correspond to the lower and upper bound of the simulated sex ratio and we use their average
as the simulation outcome. In addition, we need to adjust the simulated result upwards by roughly 5% as
discussed previously.
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rural areas was similar to the one in urban areas in 1982 and 1990 census, but became
much higher in the 2000 census. For example in our model, the simulated sex ratio for
Han Chinese living in rural areas is 109.1 in 1982 and 126.5 in 2000, indicating a 16%
increase; the simulated sex ratios for Han Chinese in both rural and urban areas are higher
than that for minorities and the difference between the two widens from 3.2 to 8.1 in urban
and 4.1 to 9.2 in rural areas; and both Han Chinese and minorities in rural areas have more
biased sex ratios as compared to the ones in urban in 2000.
However, with respect to minorities, our simulated sex ratios do not have a close
match to the actual ones, especially for the 1982 census. However, it is not appropriate
to attribute the relatively big discrepancy for minorities to our theoretical model. It is
known that natural sex ratio at birth is not 100, but 104-107, where the higher probability
of having a boy is used to compensate for the higher infant mortality rate for males. In
the 1982 census, the sex ratios for minorities in both rural and urban areas are below 104.
If one believes that 104 is the lowest natural sex ratio at birth, it seems that minorities in
China have a girl preference and may abort the incoming boy instead. However, a girl
preference for minorities contradicts with that their sex structure was also unbalanced in
the 1990 and 2000 census. Thus, we attribute the abnormally low sex ratio for minorities
in the 1982 census to a small sample error. If this were true, then our model has produced
a close match.
Our subsequent objective is to match the proportion of people who have another
child and the proportion of males of next birth. These two proportions are used to illustrate
the fitness of his model in Ebenstein (2011). Instead of solving for the maximal utility
of having a boy or a girl, Ebenstein(2011) directly assumes the value a boy or a girl
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can bring to the parents and later estimates the corresponding values using micro-level
data. Since the payoff of a child consists of the child’s value plus a random variable, it
is straightforward to estimate the probability that parents engage in sex selection and the
probability of having another child. Although our individual optimization framework is
totally different from the probabilistic model in Ebenstein (2011), we would like to see
whether our model can also perform well in this aspect.
Table 1.4: Actual versus Simulated Sex Outcomes by Sex of Existing Children
Proportion who have another child
1982 1990 2000
Parity Sex Combination Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
Overall
First None
Second One boy 0.94 0.87 0.73 0.25 0.55 0.16
One girl 0.95 0.89 0.81 0.78 0.7 0.55
Proportion of male among next birth
1982 1990 2000
Parity Sex Combination Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
Overall 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.56
First None 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53
Second One boy 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.54
One girl 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.53 0.59 0.70
The actual proportions in Table 1.4 are taken from Ebenstein (2011), which are
calculated for married women aged 35-40 and their matched children aged 0-18 from
the 1982, 1990, and 2000 census samples. There are four fertility patterns as seen in
Table 1.4. (1) Proportion of people who have another child decreases dramatically from
1982 to 2000, which coincides with the decline in the total fertility rate during the same
period. (2) This proportion is bigger for parents with a girl than those with a boy, which
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means families without a son are more likely to have another child, other things equal.
(3) Proportion of male among the next birth increases steadily, indicating a more biased
sex ratio in 2000 than in 1982. (4) This proportion is significantly higher for parents of a
daughter, especially in the 2000 census, reflecting a stronger motivation to engage in sex
selection among those whose first kid is a girl.
Although our model does not directly calibrate these two proportions, we can derive
them from parents’ choices at each decision node. In the decision process under one- and
two-child policy, people make decisions on whether to have a first (or a second) child and
whether to choose sex selection for the incoming girl. Given that we have in total I×J×K
types of parents, we can calculate how many of them have another child and how many
apply sex selection, and thus the proportions.
In terms of absolute values, our simulated proportions are a bit away from the actual
ones. One reason might be that our framework assumes perfect enforcement of the one-
child policy so that people can’t pay fines to have another child, while in reality, we do
observe families pay fines for violating the regulations, which may help explain the lower
proportion simulated from our model30. Besides this, our model matches the fertility
patterns as seen from the actual proportions. The simulated proportion who have another
child decreases between 1982 and 2000. Our simulated proportion of male of next birth
is lower for people who already have a son than those who only have a daughter. For
example, in 2000, for parents with a son, the proportion of male among the second child
is 54%, while it is nearly 70% for parents whose first kid is a girl, indicating a stronger
30To some extent, the proportion who have another child in Ebenstein (2011) seems to be over-estimated.
By 2000, urban population, accounting for 35% of the total population, can only have one child. Even if all
rural residents with a girl decide to have another child, the proportion may still be lower than 0.7.
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incentive to abort the girl fetus among families with girls.
To conclude, Table 1.3 and 1.4 jointly show that our model provides a good match
to the actual data; and given the model specification, our model behaves much better in
terms of the sex ratios. The comparison between actual and simulated sex ratio shows that
several fertility patterns and many essential elements of fertility decisions are captured by
our model and confirms that our analysis on sex ratio changes when considering certain
dimensions of heterogeneity is reasonable and convincing.
1.5 Three Extensions
1.5.1 Equilibrium Sex Ratio when Parents are Forward-Looking
As seen above, one robust result is that when parents realize the “can-not-marry”
risk and become adaptive, the society-wide sex ratio will decline. However adaptive
couples mistakenly use the sex ratio of recent newborns to approximate the sex ratio of
those unborn babies. In equilibrium, forward-looking couples would calculate this risk
based on expected sex ratio among the children’s cohort. The iterative procedure to find
such an equilibrium is as follows: forward-looking parents will assume that every couple
is rational and makes optimal decisions in the same way as they do. They first compute
this risk based on a starting sex ratio κ0 (like setting κ0 = κt) just as adaptive couples,
then make the fertility decisions. The aggregate decision from all couples behaving in this
way will generate a new sex ratio κ1. They will compare κ1 with κ0: if the two are not
the same, they realize that their previous expectation either under- or over-estimates the
underlying risk, and will adjust the starting point and iterate again until the realized sex
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ratio (κi+1) coincides with the prior expectation (κi), i.e. a fixed point31. At this steady
state, the realized “can-not-marry” risk will be identical to the expected one.
As a priori, several outcomes are possible: no equilibrium, one and only one equi-
librium, and multiple equilibria. First, we expect that the no equilibrium scenario is un-
likely because of the inherently monotonic property of our structural framework. For
κi > κj , we have mi > mj (i.e. risk under the first sex ratio is higher), the resulting
sex ratio from all couples behaving rationally will have the property that κi+1 < κj+1.
That is, in an interactive setting, if the risk is exaggerated, couples will lower the start-
ing point and if otherwise, they will adjust κi upwards. As iteration proceeds, the range
between input κi and output κi+1 will narrow; given a sufficient number of couples used
in the numerical simulation, it is expected that the difference between consecutive κi will
converge to 0. Second, multiple equilibria are possible depending on different starting
points. However, we suspect that this is more of a theoretical curiosity rather than a real-
istic consideration. We will start from a neighborhood around the current sex ratio, such
as 100 < κ0 < 130, and see if equilibrium exists and if multiple equilibria emerge. We
define the convergence criteria as the distance between κi and κi+1 being smaller than
0.001. Results are presented in Table 1.5.
A few observations deserve special attention. First and foremost, for most sce-
narios, we are able to derive one and only one equilibrium sex ratio. Second, in the
benchmark calibration adaptive parents consider the sex ratio as 120 in calculating the
“can-not-marry” risk and now forward-looking parents realize that the equilibrium sex
31A comprehensive discussion in deriving fixed point using dynamic programming method could be
found at Rust (2008).
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Note: Those indexed by ‡ refer to the average value of a small range
where the simulations enter into an oscillation, and convergence can
not be achieved.
ratios are smaller. This tells us that adaptive parents who look at current sex ratio tend
to overestimate the risk and end up in a less severe situation for their sons. As time goes
by, social learning will help adaptive couples to adjust their expectations, and in the long
run, the sex imbalance will automatically become less problematic. However, this learn-
ing depends on intergenerational knowledge transfer, which is not as easy and speedy as
one might think. Third, we face some oscillation issues in deriving the equilibrium sex
ratio for three scenarios (labeled with “‡”). After some iterations, the input and output κ
swing back and forth between two nearby points, even if we try different starting points.
Although our structural framework is monotonic, the choice variable for fertility is not
continuous. Thus, it is possible that for a range of sex ratios κ, parents’ decision on
sex selection remains unchanged until κ reaches a threshold value, when parents move
abruptly from “no sex selection” to “applying sex selection”, or vice versa, which then
induces a big jump (or fall) in the sex ratio. Under this circumstance, it is very hard to
find a fixed point. In practice, we minimize the gap between the lower and upper bound-
55
ary for the threshold value until it is small enough, and parents are almost indifferent
between doing sex selection and not. Then, we claim the middle point within this small
range as the equilibrium32. Fourth, consistent with our previous findings, when parents
are forward-looking, relaxing the one-child policy will significantly relieve the sex imbal-
ance problem, and one-and-half-child policy is even better than the full-fledged two-child
policy. Also, social insurance retains a positive but limited impact.
1.5.2 Endogenizing Children’s Transfer Rate Distribution
In our model, middle-age people make a transfer to their elderly parents and at the
same time expect their children to do the same in the future. In the above simulations,
we arbitrarily pick up a specification for such expectations. One might be interested in
finding some justification for this. A natural justification is: in a dynastic setting, the
couple’s expectation on future transfers from children is linked to the optimal transfer
decisions among the couple’s cohort. One example is generational independency, where
parents do not care about grandparents, optimally contribute nothing to grandparents, and
will not expect any transfer from their kids so that generations are independent from each
other. Another example is generational generosity, where couples pay much attention
to their elderly parents, and also expect their kids to care them in the same way. Both
are observed in reality, perhaps due to role learning. In an infinite-horizon setting (or
equivalently in a dynastic model), at equilibrium the expectation of future transfers should
be identical to the cross-sectional distribution of current transfers. To endogenize the
32Our problem is rather simple since the convergence is for one dimension only. Santos and Rust (2003)
provides a more general discussion on the convergence properties of policy iteration in a class of stationary,
infinite-horizon Markovian decision problems.
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transfer expectation, we solve for such a steady state.
Here we match the prior expectation with an ex post realized cross-sectional dis-
tribution. In a parametric framework such as ours, this can be done only if we impose
some distributional assumptions, and minimize the difference between certain parameter
values. We assume that both the expectation on future transfers and the ex post distribu-
tion of realized transfers are Beta distributed, and we match the mean between the two
distributions.
The reasons that we only focus on the mean convergence between two distributions
come from several aspects. First, we find that there is a convergence in transfer rate for
people earning above average income, indicating a small variance for the overall transfer
distribution. Second, even if the convergence criteria use both mean and variance, it is
hard to determine the corresponding weights for the differences in means and variances.
Third, as discussed in section 1.4.1, investments on sons and daughters reflect the property
of “high risk high return, low risk low return” so that Et[dt+1,boy] > Et[dt+1,girl] and
Vart(dt+1,boy) > Vart(dt+1,girl). However, the risk associated with child investment is
not only reflected in absolute terms (i.e. bigger variance for boys’ transfer), but also in
relative terms as the larger coefficient of variation for sons’ transfer. Even if both mean
and variance of the transfers from sons and daughters keep changing during the iteration
process, we suppose their corresponding coefficients of variation are constant, which then
induces a fixed coefficient of variation for the overall child investment33. Thus, for two
33The argument that constant coefficients of variations (CV) for boys and girls indicate a fixed CV for
the overall child investment is correct based on the assumption that the weights on boys’ and girls’ CV are
also constant (i.e. the composition of boys and girls in the society does not change). In our framework, this
assumption means we will not consider any composition changes due to updated sex ratio in each iteration
loop.
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distributions with the same coefficient of variation, if their means are close enough, their
variances will also converge.
As aforementioned, we assume the transfer rate follows a Beta distribution (i.e.
dt+1 ∼ Beta(α, β)) with mean m(0). To incorporate son preference, we impose mb =
1.2m, and mg = 0.7m. Based on this, we solve our model, compute the optimal choices,
and look at the cross-sectional distribution of dt, from which we can calculate m(1) and
then start the iteration process again. A distance measure on consecutive iterations is
defined as |m(i+1) −m(i)|; we consider convergence achieved if this distance measure is
smaller than a tolerance level.
As discussed previously, a couple’s expectation on future transfers from children is
related to their current optimal transfer decision, which in turn is affected directly by the
attention they place on their elderly parents (η). One might conjecture that the equilib-
rium transfer is directly related to this altruism measure, which may vary from society to
society. We consider this heterogeneity to show how the equilibrium is influenced directly
by this altruism degree. Clearly, when η = 0, parents neither care about grandparents,
nor do they expect children (if any) to care for themselves, thus the equilibrium transfer is
simply zero. Table 1.10 shows the equilibrium transfer distribution for plausible altruism
degrees.
First, we find that when parents parents become more altruistic, the equilibrium
transfer distribution moves rightwards: the mean is larger without a big variation in the
standard deviation. This represents the significant impact of η on intergenerational trans-
fers. Second, the standard error is small for every scenario, indicating the overall dis-
tribution is quite concentrated. Third, only the social insurance program has a limited
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effect on the distribution, while the one-child policy and parental expectation are quite
silent with respect to transfer distribution. Finally, compared to our benchmark assump-
tion (m = 15%), we see that the mean of the endogenized transfer is 0-4% lower when
η = 0.25, but 5-14% higher when η = 0.5.
We now proceed to calibrate the society-wide sex ratio based on the equilibrium
transfer distribution and the results are shown in Table 1.11. There are several interest-
ing findings. First, comparing Table 1.2 and 1.11, we find that when children’s transfer
distribution is endogenously derived, gender structure is much better (i.e. a decline in the
sex ratio); and for some scenarios the sex structure will be balanced. So if parents could
form their expectation on future transfers from their children in a rational way, the sex
imbalance would not be as severe as in Table 1.2. Second, the three factors play their
robust roles even after we endogenize children’s transfer distribution: relaxing the one-
child policy and shifting parental expectation could alleviate the gender imbalance, while
social insurance does not seem to help solve the problem, although its impact is quite
limited34. Third, when η rises, although the equilibrium transfer moving rightwards, the
sex ratio decreases, especially for the one-child cases.
This exercise shows the interactions between parents’ degree of altruism and their
fertility choices. Given children’s transfer distribution, a higher η induces a close to
normal sex ratio. This is intuitive: at a given transfer distribution, the return on child
34Social insurance increases the sex ratio for both myopic and adaptive parents when η = 0.25, which is
consistent with the observation in the benchmark calibration. When η rises to 0.5, adaptive parents do not
choose sex ratio with and without social insurance, while sex ratio for myopic parents even decreases in the
presence of the program. When η = 0.5, the mean of the equilibrium transfer distribution increases; given
constant coefficient of variation, the variance also becomes larger. That is, the dispersion of boy’s transfer
distribution becomes much larger while girl’s transfer is more concentrated. Thus, with a higher probability
boy’s transfer rate is smaller than that of girl (even if the mean for boy is still higher) so that fewer people
choose to do sex selection and the society arrives at a more balanced sex ratio.
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investment is fixed. When parents place more attention on their elderly parents’ welfare,
other things equal, they will transfer more and have fewer resources left to invest in chil-
dren, making sex selection unaffordable for some couples and thus reducing the sex ratio.
However, when parents are rational and endogenize their children’s transfer, the effect
of higher altruism degree on fertility choices are two-fold. On the one hand, keeping the
transfer distribution constant, a higher altruism degree directly decreases the sex ratio. On
the other hand, a higher altruism degree could indirectly lead to a more unbalanced sex
ratio through the channel of transfer distribution. In detail, the higher the altruism degree,
the higher the equilibrium transfer, and the higher the future transfer parents expect to
obtain from their children. When the mean of the equilibrium transfer increases, the gap
between sons’ and daughters’ transfer will enlarge35. This change in the relative return
from investing in boys versus girls, indicates that sons become more attractive for parents,
which will induce a more unbalanced sex ratio. According to Table 1.11, the direct effect
of higher η seems to dominate the indirect effect so that we observe a decline in the sex
ratio.
1.5.3 A Further Look at the Role of Social Insurance
Until now, we find that social insurance tends to increase the sex ratio, although its
magnitude is insignificant for most cases. This is opposite to the common belief that social
insurance could help reduce the sex ratio. The intuition is that by providing generous
pension benefits, social insurance substitutes part of children’s role: parents do not need
35For example, if the society-wide average transfer rate is 10% with boys transferring 12% and girls 8%,
the difference is 4%; while if this average transfer rate increases to 20% with boys and girls transfer 24%
and 16% respectively, the gap will double to 8%.
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to rely as much on children as otherwise. As social insurance coverage expands from
urban to rural areas, we should observe a decline in the sex ratio, other things equal.
However, it seems that our model above does not capture this feature. In our model,
social insurance works through two channels: it makes childbearing cheaper (price effect),
while increasing the life-time income for the majority (although it reduces that for the very
rich) (income effect). Now we explore two other possible channels: liquidity constraint
and social attitude changes.
First, we previously assumed that financial markets are complete so that there is no
liquidity constraint, which means people can borrow against their future pension benefits.
This will lead to a negative private saving for those poor people whose future pension
benefits occupy a large proportion of their life-time income. On the one hand, this makes
some sense in that even if the formal banking sector does not accept pension benefits as
a collateral, borrowing from informal channels like among relatives is common in China
and could help alleviate the liquidity constraint. The major risk of doing this is the adult
mortality, which is rather small for people before retirement. On the other hand, it is
possible that the liquidity constraint is binding for some people. We investigate below
how this liquidity constraint affects the sex ratio.




≥ 0, where θ ∈
[0, 1] is the index of financial market completeness. θ = 1 means agents could borrow
against the full amount of future benefits; θ = 0 means they can not use any portion
of the benefits as collateral. With the addition of this constraint, those who previously
borrow against pension benefits, will be prohibited from doing it and have a lower utility,
while others are not affected. When θ = 0, the sex ratio in the third panel of Table 1.12
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decreases, especially under the one-and-half- and two-child policies. This is justified
by the cost of childbearing and sex selection: with one child, most couples do not need
to borrow; however in the case of two kids, borrowing might become more likely, and
when a liquidity constraint is in place, these people have no resources to distort nature’s
assignment.
Second, we previously assumed that there was no change in social attitudes with
respect to future transfers from children. This is rather debatable; an alternative is to
assume that after social insurance is introduced, children’s transfer will be lower, i.e. the
distribution of both son’s and daughter’s transfer will move leftwards. Couples should be
able to anticipate this social attitude change twenty years from now, and adjust today’s
fertility decision correspondingly. This could be justified in the generational account
setting: with the introduction of a “Pay-as-You-Go” system, the first retiree generation
benefits most since they usually have a shorter contribution history, and this might trigger
a change in the social attitude with respect to transfers from children. If this possibility is
taken into account by the current parents, today’s sex ratio may be different.
We assume that with changes in social attitudes, transfer from children is ϑ (a dis-
counting factor) times the one without social insurance, and son’s transfer is discounted
more than daughter’s. Comparing the second and the forth panel in Table 1.12, we see
significant declines in sex ratio, especially for the one-child cases. That is, when par-
ents discount sons’ transfer more than daughters’, their motivation of distorting fertility
choices weakens because boys are not as attractive as before. And more couples would
think it is not worth paying a high price (sex selection cost) on a less rewarding asset
(sons). This is very similar to the “can-not-marry” risk in parental expectations, which
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lowers the transfer distribution for unmarried sons but not that of daughters. Both differ-
ential treatments have proved to be the key in reducing the sex ratio, which is a result we
would expect given that we focus on the “old-age support” motive for childbearing.
Finally, as discussed above, social insurance could affect fertility decisions through
four channels: income effect, price effect, liquidity constraints and change in social atti-
tudes. The overall effect when these four channels work together is shown in the last panel
of Table 1.12, where we see the sex ratio is perfectly balanced for most scenarios. This
should be the most comprehensive consideration of social insurance’s impact on fertility
choices and serve as an upper bound for its magnitude. Under this circumstance, social
insurance could play a significant role in correcting the unbalanced gender structure, but
it is expected that such process will take several years if not decades.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed and calibrated a dynamic fertility choice model
to explain the current gender imbalance in China. An excess of millions of males in the
marriage market and the associated social problems are hot topics in popular media and
among policy makers. While the focus of discussion has tended to be on the impact of
one policy environment (either the one-child policy or social insurance) on sex imbalance,
relatively little attention has been given to the reverse role of the sex imbalance on fertility
choices. Our analysis shed light on some of the mechanisms underlying fertility in China,
particularly the roles of the one-child policy, social insurance, and parental expectations,
and we used the model to predict impacts of a number of policy changes designed to
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reduce the high ratio of boys to girls at birth.
Our model provides a rough match to sex ratios of selected groups in subsamples of
the 1982, 1990 and 2000 censuses from China. However we did not attempt to undertake
a systematic calibration using a wider set of data as the three period model studied in
this paper is rather simplified and stylized along a number of dimensions and this makes
it hard to directly confront all of the predictions of the model to the data. Instead, the
focus of the analysis has been on using this simple model to gain qualitative insights of
the impacts of a number of different policy changes, some that have already occurred, and
others that are hypothetical policy options not yet undertaken that might be considered for
addressing the sex ratio imbalance problem in China.
We show that moving from a stringent one-child policy to a one-and-half-child pol-
icy (second allowed if the first is a girl) would dramatically decrease the sex ratio at birth
from 125 to 106. When social insurance coverage is universal, changes in the sex ratio
are quite limited if the social attitude remains the same (i.e. parents do not modify their
expectation on children’s transfer), which suggests that at this moment the underdevel-
oped social insurance does not contribute to substituting sons’ role. However, we also
notice that social insurance could play a significant role if social attitude regarding child
transfer shifts. Meanwhile, the model predicts that if parents are adaptive and consider the
“can-not-marry” risk, the sex ratio will drop from 125 to 110 under the one-child policy,
and by a smaller amount if the one-child policy is relaxed.
Our analysis not only models couples’ fertility behavior in the context of interac-
tions between birth control policy, social insurance, and parental expectation, but also
has policy implications regarding optimal ways to draw the imbalance back to normal.
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Although relaxing the one-child policy is the most intuitive option, this could lead to a
significant increase in total fertility rate, especially among poor people. The mechanism
of social insurance is more complicated, and the change in social attitude could be very
slow. Raising sex selection cost like enforcing the abortion ban could prevent people from
distorting their fertility choices, but from the eyes of the government, it is very costly to
enforce the regulation. However, shifting parental expectations by publicity campaigns
and education to let parents be aware of the “marriage squeeze” sons have to face, could
dramatically help alleviate the gender imbalance issue. Such a policy is most effective be-
cause couples themselves would adjust their fertility choices without serious government
interventions. It also avoids the concerns of rising population growth.
There are many extensions to this work that could provide further insights into the
gender imbalance problem. First, this paper focuses on the “old-age support” motive for
childbearing; the altruism motivation is also important. Modeling both motivations simul-
taneously could help clarify their relative importance in formulating the son preference.
Second, while the three-period framework in this paper enables us to compare the cali-
brated outcomes with actual ratios for several census years, it lacks the adequate power
to predict peoples’ fertility behavior from year to year. A life-cycle model where a period
corresponds to one year would be useful to match the actual time series, and to understand
the timing of childbearing. Third, this paper calibrates the structural model for various
counterfactual experiments on the basis of arbitrary choices over some key parameters,
such as sex selection cost and children’s future transfer rate. Although we undertake sen-
sitivity analysis on sex selection cost and endogenize children’s transfer distribution, it
would be better if we could utilize micro-level data and empirically estimate these param-
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eters by matching moments from simulations to the data. We leave these extensions for
future work.
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Numerical Root-Finding Procedure
In principle, under the one-child policy, equation LHS(st) = RHS(st) defines an
optimal st, which in turn yields the optimal value of consumption, transfer and the max-
imal utility for the middle-aged parents. We now show that under certain parametric
restrictions, the solution to LHS(st) = RHS(st) exists and is unique.
By inspection, we see the following four results. First, given the child mortality
risk, Equation (1.3) says parents with precautionary saving motives (assuming they can
borrow against their pension benefit36) have
st ≥ sMin = −
SIt
Rt+1(1− αt)Wt
Second, due to the non-negativity of current parents’ consumption (Cmt ) and transfer (dt),
Equation (1.2) says the maximal saving parents could have37 is




36If we assume financial market is incomplete, then sMin is zero.
37If grandparents are willing to sacrifice so that dt < 0, we still have the non-negativity of current
consumption (Cmt and C
o
t ), and the upper bound of saving will be increased by (Rtst−1(1−αt−1)Wt−1+
SIt−1)/(ft−1(1− αt)Wt).
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= +∞. Fourth, for those st >
sMin, we have ∂RHS(st)
∂st
< 0, and limst→sMin
∂RHS(st)
∂st
= +∞. Therefore, if the parameter
values are chosen such that sMin < sMax, there exists a unique solution to the equation





is very large, it is possible that they can afford neither the fixed
sex selection price nor the fixed childbearing cost38. In this case, we have sMin > sMax,
so it is not surprising that there is no solution to the equation. Those poor parents will go
bankrupt if they decide to have kids.
However, even if there exists a unique solution to the equation LHS(st) = RHS(st),
it has no analytical form. Because RHS(st) involves integrals and numerical integration
is time-consuming, the process to find s∗t is excruciatingly slow.
Here, the first time-saving step is to construct discrete approximations39 to the Beta
and lognormal distributions as opposed to full-fledged numerical integrations. In this
way, we can transform integration operations in Equation (1.11) into summations over
values evaluated at each grid point. However, approximating the Beta and the lognormal
distribution separately will end up with nested summations and make the whole process
time-consuming. For example, under the one-child policy scenario, we will face two
double integrals on the RHS and we need to calculate four nested summations.
Therefore, to further speed up the computation, we propose a simplification method
38This is different from the “Double-Income-No-Kid” problem, where the issue is on the income-varying
part of sex selection and childbearing.
39An n-point equiprobable grid is created based on Carroll (2011). In terms of approximating the log-
normal distribution, we define a set of points on the [0, 1] interval as ] = {0, 1/n, 2/n, ..., 1}. Denote
the inverse of the lognormal distribution as F−1] , and define the points ]
−1




θ dF(θ). The θi represent the mean values of θ in each of the regions bounded by the ]−1i
endpoints, and are used to approximate the true lognormal distribution.
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by constructing a discrete approximation to the product of Beta and lognormal distribu-
tions so that double integral could be reduced to single integral. In detail, we first cre-
ate the discrete approximation separately for Beta and lognormal distributions based on
100-point equiprobable grid. Although the parametric form of the combined distribution
dt+1wt+1 is unknown, its empirical distribution could be simulated by multiplying the
grid points from the previous approximations (100 × 100 = 10, 000 grid points). Then,
we can construct a discrete approximation to this empirical distribution based on an n-
point equiprobable grid, in which we treat dt+1wt+1 as one single random variable40.
To test the speed and accuracy of this simplification method, we pick the “one-girl,
without social insurance, myopic parents” scenario as an experiment. For a given com-
bination of Wt−1,j and Wt+1,k, we solve the optimal s∗t through root-finding for parents
earning [0.1, 6]W t. For 60 types of parents, it takes around 2.35 minutes to solve s∗t using
separate approximations to Beta and lognormal distributions, while the time is shortened
to 0.05 minutes using the above simplification method and choosing n = 25, which is
almost 50 times faster. In terms of accuracy, the discrepancies in s∗t between the two
methods are within the range [6.8 × 10−7, 0.00018]. This experiment demonstrates that
our simplification method helps speed up the whole process without sacrificing accura-
cies.
However, even after adopting the above simplification method, we still face a double
integral in the two-child cases. Inspired by the method of treating the product of two ran-
dom variables as a single one, we further treat the sum of two random variables as a single
40Although dt+1 and wt+1 are two different random variables, they always enter the model in the format
of dt+1wt+1, which inspires us to think the feasibility of treating them as one random variable.
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one. First, we construct a discrete approximation to the distribution of dt+1wt+1. Second,
if both kids grow up, the RHS will involve terms like
∑2
i=1 dt+1,iwt+1,i. From previous
example, our simplification method could find close approximation to dt+1,iwt+1, which
means we can adopt the same method again to approximate
∑2
i=1 dt+1,iwt+1,i. In this
way, the four-dimensional integral could be simplified into a single integral. We compare
the speed and accuracy in solving optimal s∗t under the “two-girl” scenario using two ap-
proximation methods. The time to solve s∗t for 60 types of parents is only 0.23 minutes,
while it takes around 45.7 minutes using separate approximations to Beta and lognormal
distributions. What’s more, the discrepancies in s∗t between the two methods are less
than 8.2× 10−5. Not surprising, the reduction from four nested sums to one loop of sum
tremendously improves the efficiency, for a given tolerance level.
Finally, picking up the starting point is also a subtle issue. On the one hand, since
both LHS(st) and RHS(st) have continuous derivatives, Newton’s methods are sufficient.
On the other hand, savings are determined by both precautionary motive and intertemporal
consumption smoothing motive. Thus, the starting point of the numerical root-finding
procedure should be close to sMin, which is determined by RHS(st), rather than sMax,
which is derived by minimizing current consumption. This works well in all our cases.
1.7.2 The Solution for Two-Child Models
The model for the “two boys with sex selection, social insurance and adaptive par-
ents” scenario is described as Equation (1.13)-(1.18). The first-order conditions will be
the same as Equation (1.7) and (1.8). We can substitute out dt, which leaves us an equation































































∀z ∈ {y1, x1, y2, x2} , z ≡ Log(dzt+1wt+1)
dzt+1 ∼ Beta(α
z, βz)
log(wt+1) ∼ N (µ, σ2)
R ≡ (−∞,+∞)
D ≡ R× R
1.7.3 Benchmark Parameters
Table 1.6 provides a summary of parameters for the benchmark calibration. First,
since we solve a three-period life-cycle model in a partial equilibrium framework, we
need to set values for interest rates, wage levels, etc. across periods. (1) Rt is computed
as the product of annual real gross interest rate between 1986 and 2005, which is slightly
smaller than 1. One might conjecture that the real interest rate will stay at a relatively low
level between 2006-2025, so we assume Rt+1 = (1 + 1%)20. (2) gt and gt+1 represent
the real GDP growth rate, which are used to approximate the real wage growth. The
geometric average annual GDP growth rate for period 1986-2005 is 9.56%. We pick 6%
as its annual growth during 2006-2025, accounting for the recent financial crisis. (3)
W t+s,∀s ∈ {−1, 0, 1} are the average labor income. We normalize W t = 1 and set
W t−1 = W t/gt and W t+1 = gt+1W t. (4) Within each period, we define relative wage
(wt+s,i,∀s ∈ {−1, 0, 1}) as the ratio of individual wage to average wage level. There is
a cross-sectional distribution of this relative wage. wt,i and wt−1,i follow the empirical
income distribution for year 2005 and 1985 correspondingly. wt+1,i is assumed to follow
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Table 1.6: Benchmark Parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Macro Economy
Number of years per period T 20
Risk-free real interest rate 1986-2005 Rt 0.940
Risk-free real interest rate 2006-2025 Rt+1 1.220
GDP growth rate 1986-2005 gt 5.210
GDP growth rate 2006-2025 gt+1 2.207
Average labor income at period t W t 1.000
Preferences
Discount factor δ 0.818
Parents altruism towards grandparents η 0.250
Child Investment
Mortality rate between age 0 and 19 p 0.025
Childbearing cost: fixed part a 0.050
Childbearing cost: income-varying part b 0.100
Sex selection cost: fixed part c 0.050
Sex selection cost: income-varying part φ 0.050
Mean transfer from married sons (as a share of income) mb 18%
Mean transfer from daughters (as a share of income) mg 10.5%
Discount factor for mean transfer from unmarried sons λ 0.75
Social Insurance
Marginal tax rate αt 0.080
Actuarial fairness index βt 0.800
Minimal pension ratio γt 0.100
State Variables
Total fertility rate in 1985 ft−1 2.600
Average private saving rate in 1985 st−1 0.150
the same distribution as wt,i under the Raw weighting matrix. The Adj weighting matrix
assumes an income-varying expectation on such distribution as discussed in section 1.4.2.
Second, the utility function is set as the natural logarithm, and the intertemporal
discount factor is set as δ = 0.9920. In addition we also need a value for η (parents’
attention on grandparents’ utility). As expected, there is no direct data measuring this,
and it should vary across households. Boldrin et al. (2005) calibrates their model using
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Table 1.7: Relative Income Distribution for Calibration
Percentile 0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 81-90% 91-100%
wt−1 0.4629 0.5528 0.6480 0.7844 0.9500 1.1563 1.4077 1.9196
wt 0.2414 0.3553 0.4595 0.6340 0.8733 1.2010 1.6507 2.7593
Means of wt+1 0.2414 0.3553 0.4595 0.6340 0.8733 1.2010 1.6507 2.7593
η = 0.185 for England. Here we set it as 0.25, since influenced by the Confucian doctrine,
Chinese people tend to care more about their elderly parents’ old-age life.
Third, child mortality rate between age 0 and 19 is calculated based on the life table
from the World Health Organization.
Fourth, social insurance benefit reflects a combination of minimum living standards
and personal contribution history. The minimum pension is a small percentage of average
wage level, and the contribution-based benefit is positively related to individual contribu-
tion. From year 2000 onwards, Chinese workers on average contribute 8% of their wages
to the social insurance trust fund. We further assume the actuarial fairness index equal
0.8, and the minimum pension ratio is 10%. We also assume that grandparents in this
model are not covered by any pension system.
Finally, values for the two state variables are chosen to be TFR and the saving rate
of the middle-aged in the 1980s, where we approximate the latter by household saving
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(c) Two-Child Policy, With Social Insurance



























































(b) One-N-Half-Child Policy, With Social Insurance, Adaptive parents































































(b) One-N-Half-Child Policy, With Social Insurance, Adaptive Parents





Figure 1.13: Numerical Root-Finding: An Example
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Table 1.8: Society-Wide Sex Ratio under Different Choices of Fixed Cost c
Myopic Parents 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months
Raw Adj Raw Adj Raw Adj
SI-No
One-Child 249.1 337.8 113.7 135.6 100.0 100.0
One-N-Half-Child 120.3 131.7 102.5 108.8 100.0 100.0
Two-Child 137.0 172.7 103.1 112.9 100.0 100.0
SI-Yes
One-Child 393.8 433.0 119.4 147.7 100.0 100.0
One-N-Half-Child 142.8 150.4 102.6 109.0 100.0 100.0
Two-Child 175.5 210.9 104.4 115.5 100.0 100.0
Adaptive Parents 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months
Raw Adj Raw Adj Raw Adj
SI-No
One-Child 135.1 185.8 104.0 115.3 100.0 100.0
One-N-Half-Child 109.0 119.7 100.8 103.9 100.0 100.0
Two-Child 110.7 130.2 100.6 102.9 100.0 100.0
SI-Yes
One-Child 175.3 214.5 105.2 117.8 100.0 100.0
One-N-Half-Child 116.6 125.8 100.8 104.0 100.0 100.0
Two-Child 121.3 141.8 101.9 109.2 100.0 100.0
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Table 1.9: Society-Wide Sex Ratio under Different Choices of Income-Varying Cost φ
Myopic Parents 9 Months 12 Months 15 Months
Raw Adj Raw Adj Raw Adj
SI-No
One-Child 141.8 195.9 113.7 135.6 105.1 117.4
One-N-Half-Child 112.2 124.4 102.5 108.8 100.8 103.9
Two-Child 117.5 141.3 103.1 112.9 100.6 102.9
SI-Yes
One-Child 177.2 235.1 119.4 147.7 105.2 117.8
One-N-Half-Child 112.6 124.8 102.6 109.0 100.8 104.0
Two-Child 124.1 151.7 104.4 115.5 100.6 103.0
Adaptive Parents 9 Months 12 Months 15 Months
Raw Adj Raw Adj Raw Adj
SI-No
One-Child 110.4 136.6 104.0 115.3 100.0 100.0
One-N-Half-Child 103.4 110.9 100.8 103.9 100.0 100.0
Two-Child 105.1 117.9 100.6 102.9 100.0 100.0
SI-Yes
One-Child 122.5 157.0 105.2 117.8 100.0 100.0
One-N-Half-Child 104.0 111.7 100.8 104.0 100.0 100.0
Two-Child 107.1 124.0 101.9 109.2 100.0 100.0
Table 1.10: Simulated Equilibrium Distribution of Children’s Transfer Rate
Myopic Adaptive
η = 0.25 η = 0.5 η = 0.25 η = 0.5
Mean (S.E.) Mean (S.E.) Mean (S.E.) Mean (S.E.)
SI-No
One-Child 11.47 (1.38) 22.10 (2.00) 11.46 (1.39) 22.10 (2.02)
One-N-Half-Child 11.04 (1.68) 20.99 (2.18) 11.03 (1.68) 21.03 (2.12)
Two-Child 10.63 (2.18) 19.94 (3.06) 10.64 (2.19) 19.96 (3.01)
SI-Yes
One-Child 15.08 (2.02) 28.92 (3.50) 15.08 (2.02) 28.90 (3.51)
One-N-Half-Child 14.75 (1.47) 27.46 (2.08) 14.72 (1.47) 27.43 (2.10)
Two-Child 14.38 (1.26) 26.36 (1.48) 14.40 (1.28) 26.35 (1.48)
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Table 1.11: Sex Ratio Based on Simulated Equilibrium Distribution of Children’s Trans-
fer Rate
Myopic Adaptive
η = 0.25 η = 0.5 η = 0.25 η = 0.5
Raw Adj Raw Adj Raw Adj Raw Adj
SI-No
One-Child 112.5 127.0 104.5 116.8 103.3 107.0 100.0 100.0
One-N-Half-Child 102.0 106.6 101.5 105.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Two-Child 103.0 112.6 101.0 103.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SI-Yes
One-Child 119.4 147.7 100.0 100.0 105.2 117.8 100.0 100.0
One-N-Half-Child 102.6 109.0 100.0 100.0 100.8 104.0 100.0 100.0
Two-Child 100.6 103.0 102.1 104.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 1.12: Calibrated Sex Ratio for Different Channels of Social Insurance
Myopic Adaptive
Raw Adj Raw Adj
SI-No One-Child 113.7 135.6 104.0 115.3
One-N-Half-child 102.5 108.8 100.8 103.9
Two-Child 103.1 112.9 100.6 102.9
SI-Yes One-Child 119.4 147.7 105.2 117.8
Benchmark One-N-Half-child 102.6 109.0 100.8 104.0
Two-Child 104.4 115.5 101.9 109.2
SI-Yes One-Child 119.4 147.7 105.2 117.8
Benchmark One-N-Half-Child 100.9 104.2 100.0 100.0
+ Liquidity Constraint Two-Child 102.1 110.0 100.0 100.0
SI-Yes One-Child 105.7 119.0 100.0 100.0
Benchmark One-N-Half-Child 100.9 104.2 100.0 100.0
+ Social Attitude Change Two-Child 100.7 103.1 100.0 100.0
SI-Yes One-Child 105.7 119.4 100.0 100.0
Benchmark One-N-Half-Child 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
+ Liq. Cons. + ∆ Soc. Attitude Two-Child 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Chapter 2
Risky Child Investment, Fertility, and Social Insurance in China
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
As the most populous country, China has had a continuous decline in its total fer-
tility rate (TFR) since the 1960s. A nation-wide family control policy that restricts urban
families to have only one child and rural families to have at most two kids was imple-
mented in the 1970s to control the population growth, and it appears to be the driving
force behind the TFR decline. However, the time-series data show that TFR in China
peaked at 5.9 kids in 1967, dropped dramatically to 3.1 in 1977 before the start of the
one-child policy, then fell between 1978 and 1980 from 2.9 to 2.6. The TFR remained
around 2.6 until 1986, and then entered another period of decline from 2.6 to 1.8 between
1987 to 1998. After that, the TFR stabilized around 1.8 until 2009.
When the one-child policy was initially implemented, it prevented people who al-
ready have one or two kids from bearing another one and restricted people without chil-
dren to have only one child. The sharp decline in TFR between 1978 and 1986 comes
from the reduction of childbearing from those who already have children. However, the
decline after 1986 is different: more and more people decided not to have children instead
of cutting the number of children they wanted to have because of the policy constraint.
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Thus, it is clear that the one-child policy can not explain the big drop from 1967 to 1977
prior to its imposition, and it is not strong enough to explain the further drop between
1986 and 2009 when it is already widely publicized and enforced. In fact, especially
since 2000, the one-child constraint has been relaxed in some places in China. Therefore,
it seems like a puzzle why the TFR kept declining after 1985. The purpose of this paper
is to investigate whether the advent of social insurance can explain the decline in TFR
between 1986 and 2009.
Existing literature demonstrates a significantly negative correlation between TFR
and social insurance generosity. China launched its social insurance program in the early
1990s, which motivates us to examine whether the introduction of this program was the
primary cause of the decline in TFR. Although the development of social insurance coin-
cides with the drop in TFR, this observation does not reveal by what means this program
was able to affect peoples’ fertility choices, since many other factors also changed during
the same period. We focus on several channels through which social insurance affects
childbearing decisions and show that this program helps reduce TFR particularly through
the liquidity constraints social insurance tax rates induce on the poor, while increases
TFR if people can borrow against their pension benefits through informal channels. Thus,
factors outside the one-child policy and social insurance may play a dominating role in
reducing TFR and keeping it at a very low level after 1986; we acknowledge that other
effects that affect return on investment in children could be contributing factors.
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2.1.2 International Background
According to US Census Bureau, world population is expected to reach more than
9 billion in 2050, accompanied with a falling growth rate, which was more than 2% in
the 1960s and is projected to be only 0.5% in 2050. However, the pattern is quite uneven
across the globe: the population growth will be contributed exclusively by the developing
countries; while the population in the developed nations will most likely decline because
of the total fertility rate falling below the replacement levels. For example, nowadays
countries in Middle East and Sub-Sahara Africa still experience a growth as high as 3%;
while the growth rate is less than 1% in developed countries and even becomes negative
in Central and Eastern Europe.
Given that one major motive for childbearing is the old-age support, one might
ask whether the development in social insurance program, which provides an alternative
for retirement funding, can explain the sharp differences in population growth between
developed and developing countries. Indeed, under any current classification standard1,
there is much difference in social insurance coverage between developed and developing
nations. Within the former group, social insurance was established several decades ago,
has developed into a rather comprehensive system, and is run extremely proficiently. In
the US, several government-sponsored programs are well designed to take care of the
post-retirement lives, like Social Security, Medicare, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration (PBGC) program, the railroad retirement program, etc. And in the case of Social
1To define developed and developing countries, IMF and World Bank usually look at two criteria: (1)
income per capita, (2) industrialization. United Nations Development Programme devised a human devel-
opment index (HDI) that considers three dimensions: (1) life expectancy, (2) years of schooling, and (3)
GNI per capita (PPP US$).
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Security, all administrative duties are performed at a cost of 0.9 percent of total expendi-
tures, or less than a penny per dollar2. Similar retirement funding programs are offered
in all OECD countries, and pension benefits are very generous in welfare states like Swe-
den. Within the latter group, many developing countries are in the process of setting up
a formal social insurance program or undergoing dramatic reforms. For example, Chile
introduced a system of privately managed individual accounts in 1981, and this Chilean
model was adopted by 10 other countries in Latin America since 1990. Despite a series
of improvements made to the system, however, it still faced several challenges, includ-
ing high administrative fees. In 2008, the system was overhauled. According to the
international research program at the U.S. Social Security Administration, most devel-
oping countries only place the old-age security program in their priority list, but not the
unemployment or health insurance; in some Asian nations, only certain type of people
can apply for unemployment or health insurance benefits; and in most African countries,
programs of similar type are of limited scope.
In the context of comparison between developing and developed countries, it seems
that there exists a strong correlation between peoples’ fertility choices and the social
insurance progress. When the social insurance program is comprehensive and generous,
people tend to raise fewer kids, while they may rear more with a less-developed program.
Several papers provide empirical tests of the old-age security motivation for child-
bearing by looking at the influence of social insurance on fertility in developed countries.
Boldrin et al. (2005) argue that an increase in government provided old-age pensions is
strongly correlated with a reduction in fertility. They show that the impact of social secu-
2This data is from http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/admin.html.
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rity on fertility is sizeable in their model, which accounts for 55% to 65% of the observed
Europe-US fertility differences both across countries and over time, while the altruism
motivation of childbearing is shown to have a small effect.
Billari and Galasso (2008) propose an empirical test using the Italian pension re-
forms in the 1990s as a natural experiment, which suddenly and substantially decreased
pension prospects for a large group of individuals and thus introduced a clear disconti-
nuity in the size of future pension benefits across workers. The empirical results identify
a clear and robust effect: less generous future pensions have induced more post-reform
fertility, which is again consistent with the old-age security motive.
In addition, Ehrlich and Kim (2007) show that social security taxes and benefits
generate incentives to reduce both family formation and fertility. Through a dynamic
over-lapping generation model and using panel data from 57 countries over 32 years, they
illustrate that the social security tax measures account for a non-trivial part of the down-
ward trends in fertility; and the result is significant and sizeable for OECD countries, but
insignificant for non-OECD countries. Similarly, Zhang and Zhang (2004) find that the
estimated coefficient on social security is significantly negative in the fertility equation,
using data on a group of market economies in the 1960-2000 period.
To sum up, for the seemingly negative correlation between social insurance progress
and peoples’ fertility choices, the above literature shows that this is true at least in devel-
oped countries. They further proceed to interpret it as a causality relationship.
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention the often neglected feedback channel: while
social insurance is associated with a lower fertility, the prospect of fewer kids poses a
solvency challenge for a pay-as-you-go system. In this sense, the generosity of a pension
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program itself is inadvertently contributing to its own funding problem in the long run.
2.1.3 Contribution
We develop a tractable life-cycle model to capture peoples’ decisions on whether
or not to have children and how many they would like to have. In light of the old-age
support motive, in our model parents view children as risky investment goods, where the
risks come from mortality that children can not grow up to adults and the expected transfer
parents obtain in the next period. The major feature of our framework is a macro aggre-
gation based on micro optimization. Instead of focusing on a representative agent in the
general equilibrium framework, we solve the individual dynamic fertility choice model in
a partial equilibrium framework for agents with heterogeneous budget constraints, then
aggregate individual fertility choices to obtain the society-wide TFR.
Our calibration results match the declining trend in TFR quite well. A decomposi-
tion of the calibrated TFRs reveals that the combined price and income effects of social
insurance tend to increase the TFR by a limited amount, while imposing the liquidity con-
straint helps reduce the fertility rate significantly. Moreover, the price and income effects
are heterogeneous depending on peoples’ positions in the income distribution: relatively
poor people tend to have more kids since the two effects work in the same direction,
while income effect dominates the price effect for relatively rich people so that their fer-
tility rate falls. Our results are not consistent with the negative relationship between social
insurance tax rate and fertility rate in Boldrin et al. (2005). An increase in tax rate has
trivial impact on peoples’ fertility choices in our framework. Beyond this, we bring out
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other factors that could have important influence on fertility choices such as the expected
GDP growth rate, childbearing cost, and expected children’s transfer rate. All these fac-
tors jointly determine the rate of return on child investment, which we think is the key
element people consider when making fertility decisions.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the dy-
namic fertility choice model and discusses several channels through which social insur-
ance can affect fertility. Section 2.3 presents the main calibration results. In order to
examine the relationship between social insurance and fertility, we calibrate our theoreti-
cal model to match the 1985 and 2005 TFRs in China, which represents the scenarios with
and without social insurance. We further simulate our model under hypothetical scenarios
to isolate the role of social insurance from other factors. In Section 2.4, we show how the
price and income effects as well as the liquidity constraint affect the fertility choices of
families with heterogeneous income. Section 2.5 provides sensitivity analysis on child-
bearing cost, potential change in social attitudes and the social insurance tax rate. We
make some concluding remarks in Section 2.6.
2.2 The Model
The theoretical framework in this paper is a dynamic fertility choice model, which
examines peoples’ decisions on whether or not to have children and how many children
they would like to have. Instead of assuming the number of children is a continuous
variable, we suppose peoples’ fertility choice is discrete in that they can choose to have
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one, two or three children3. Considering that the one-child policy may not be the driving
force for the consistent TFR decline after 1985, we do not impose the one-child limit
in our framework. To determine the optimal number of children to bear, parents will
compare the expected life-time utility under each situation, assuming other decisions like
consumption, saving and transferring to elderly parents are made optimally.
2.2.1 A Generic Model
We assume individuals can live three periods: young, middle-age, and old4. Young
individuals simply consume parents’ resources to grow up. When they are middle-aged,
they supply one unit of labor, obtain income5 (Wt) and make optimal decisions on fertility
(0, 1, 2, or 3), consumption (Cmt ), saving (st), and transfer to their elderly parents (dt).
Under the old-age support motivation, parents view children as investment goods and
expect to receive transfers from them when parents become old next period. The level of
attention adult children give to their elderly parents is denoted by η, which can also be
regarded as the degree of altruism of adult children (i.e. parents in our model) to their
elderly parents (i.e. grandparents). In addition, the cost of rearing children consists of
3Although we observe some families having more than three kids, the maximum number of children
considered in our framework is three. Based on the United Nations data, worldwide average TFR was
around 4.9 in the 1950s, decreased to 3.5 in the 1980s, 2.6 in the 2000s, and is projected to fall to 2.2 in
2050. In the US, TFR fell from 3.7 in 1960 to 2.1 in 2008; in China this number decreased from 5.5 in 1960
to 1.8 in 2008; and for European Union countries, the TFR was only 1.6 in 2008. Considering all these
historical data and the predicted trend, we believe a fertility quota of three children per family is reasonable
and should not distort our main conclusion.
4To avoid confusion, we call them children, parents (or adult children), and grandparents (or elderly
parents).
5Here is a rule for notation: lower-case letters usually represent the percentage or ratio, while upper-
cases represent the absolute level. For example W t is the society-wide average income, Wt,i is the income
for individual i, and the corresponding relative income is wt,i = Wt,i/W t. Similarly, st,i represents the
private saving rate for individual i, while St,i = st,iWt,i is his/her private saving amount. For ease of
notation, we omit the subscript i.
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two parts: a fixed cost (a) and an income-varying cost (bWt). When individuals become
old, they retire and their consumption is financed from three sources: the transfers from
their adult children (Dt+1), private saving from the previous period (Rt+1stWt) and social
insurance benefits (SIt+1) if they are covered by the program.
In this framework, children are viewed as risky investments in the eyes of their
parents. On the one hand, with probability p, young individuals can not grown up (i.e.
mortality risk); on the other hand, children’s transfers in the next period (Dt+1) are un-
certain. In detail, we decompose the transfer amount as: Dt+1 = dt+1wt+1W t+1, where
both transfer rate (dt+1) and children’s relative income (wt+1) are random variables6. We
further assume that dt+1 follows a Beta distribution which guarantees the transfer rate is
within the range of [0, 1]; and wt+1 is log-normally distributed, which ensures that the
relative income is positive, and the median income is smaller than the mean, as consistent
with empirical income distributions.
A generic version of the individual optimization problem when social insurance
program is in place is as follows7:
6We do not assume aggregate growth uncertainties, so W t+1 will grow in a deterministic way.
7In our framework, we don’t consider the economies of scale in raising children so that the cost of
bearing two kids is twice as much as that of having one child. In addition, we assume transfers from
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dt+1,iwt+1,i(1− αt+1)W t+1 +Rt+1st(1− αt)Wt + SIt (2.3)
Cot = ft−1dt(1− αt)Wt +Rtst−1(1− αt−1)Wt−1 + SIt−1 (2.4)
SIt =
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γt−1W t−1 + βt−1αt−1(1− bft−1)Wt−1
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Rt (2.6)
ft ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} (2.7)
For fixed ft the F.O.C.s are:
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(Cot ) (2.9)
Using logarithmic utility function and after some algebraic manipulation of (2.8) and




(1− st − bft −
aft
(1− αt)Wt
)− Rtst−1(1− αt−1)Wt−1 + SIt−1
(1 + η)ft−1(1− αt)Wt
(2.10)
The solution is characterized by an equation on st: LHS(st) = RHS(st), where
LHS(st) =
(1 + η)ft−1
(1− st − bft − aft(1−αt)Wt )(1− αt)Wtft−1 +Rtst−1(1− αt−1)Wt−1 + SIt−1
(2.11)
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However, RHS(st) depends on the number of children parents decide to have. We first















dt+1wt+1(1− αt+1)W t+1 +Rt+1st(1− αt)Wt + SIt
f(dt+1)f(wt+1)d(dt+1)d(wt+1) (2.12)
where,
dt+1 ∼ Beta(αd, βd)
log(wt+1) ∼ N (µ, σ2)
R ≡ (−∞,+∞)
Double integrations are necessary in eq. (2.12), because we assume both transfer rate
dt+1 and relative wage wt+1 are random variables. Given our parametric assumptions,
there is no analytical solution for the equation LHS(st) = RHS(st). The justification on
the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution can be found in section 1.7.1, except
that due to different model specifications, the expression for sMax is 1− bft − aft(1−αt)Wt .
In order to find numerical solutions, we could construct discrete approximations
to the two continuous distributions, i.e. find the appropriate grid points to represent the
corresponding distributions and approximate the integral by summations. However, ap-
proximating the Beta and the log-normal distribution separately will end up with nested
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summations and be time-consuming8. A more efficient alternative is to approximate the
product distribution. Although there is no analytical density function of the product dis-
tribution, we could generate a representative sample from it, by first simulating two large
samples from the Beta and log-normal distributions separately, and second multiplying
the simulated grid points from the above two samples. Denoting z = dt+1wt+1, we have









z(1− αt+1)W t+1 +Rt+1st(1− αt)Wt + SIt
fZ(z)dz (2.13)
After this, we could select a certain number of grid points from the simulated product
distribution fZ(z), and then approximate the integral by summation.




























8Applying the discretization to the Beta and the log-normal distribution separately will cause more
efficiency problems when people choose to have two or three children. In the two-child case, if both
children successfully survive to adulthood, one need to calculate two double-integrals, or do four nested
summations. By the same token, the three-child case requires six nested summations to approximate the
integrals. Not surprisingly, computing burden will then increase exponentially.























































2.2.2 Does Social Insurance Really Reduce Fertility Rate?
A close look at the model, however, shows that things are more complicated than
the intuitive idea that fertility drops in the presence of social insurance. In fact, social
insurance has a heterogeneous effect on fertility and its impact is reflected through several
channels: the price effect, the income effect, the liquidity constraint effect, and the change
in expectation on future transfers.
The first channel through which social insurance directly affects fertility is the in-
come effect. As an income redistribution program, social insurance favors poor people at
the expense of the rich. After the introduction of social insurance, poor peoples’ present
discounted value of life-time income should increase while that of the rich decreases.
Since children, saving, transfer, and consumption are all normal goods, poor people would
like to raise more kids and the rich tend to rear fewer.
The second channel is the direct price effect. We assume the income-varying part of
the childbearing cost is tax-deductible: parents could either send children to daycare and
deduct the child-care expense when filing their tax returns, or reduce their labor supply,
like working at home, to take care of their kids. After social insurance tax is introduced,
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the actual income-varying cost is (1− αt)bWt instead of bWt. This is equivalent to a per-
child subsidy of the size αtbWt. Since childbearing becomes cheaper, the fertility rate
should increase, for both the poor and the rich.
Combining these two effects, however, we find that the effects work in the same
direction for poor people so that they will have more kids; the effects are offsetting for
the rich so whether they have more or fewer kids depends on which effect dominates.
Since a country’s TFR is an average fertility choice of different types of people and given
that the income distribution is usually more skewed to the left (far more people below the
mean than those above), it could happen that the overall fertility rate could increase after
a pension system is introduced, instead of declining as Boldrin et al. (2005) have argued.
However, it is too early to conclude that social insurance should increase TFR since there
are two indirect channels that this program could affect peoples’ fertility decisions.
The third channel is whether people can borrow against their future pension bene-
fits. Our previous argument that social insurance increases the life-time income for the
poor but decreases that for the rich holds under the condition that financial markets are
complete so that people can borrow against their future pension benefits. This will lead to
a negative private saving rate, especially for those poor people whose future pension ben-
efits occupy a large proportion of their life-time income. The assumption of a complete
market makes some sense in that several informal channels like borrowing from relatives
are available in China. On the other hand, we also need to acknowledge that a mature
consumer credit market does not exist in China11. Hence any informal borrowing may be
11This is in great contrast to the advanced economies, where the credit market is well developed. In
the US, several state pension benefit agencies have the pension loan programs, and various commercial
products are available, like the loan provisions under 401(k) plans.
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able to lessen the liquidity constraint, but not eliminate it completely. So the degree of
liquidity constraint should be a continuous variable between 0 and 1. This effect will be
explicitly considered in our calibration exercises.
The fourth channel is a potential change in peoples’ expectations. Once social insur-
ance is introduced, a social attitude on who cares for the elderly may shift. The grown-up
children in the next period, after realizing that their elderly parents’ retirement lives are
taken care of by the pension plans, will feel that their role of supporting elderly parents’
old-age life has been substituted, and thus exhibit less altruistic behavior (i.e. a smaller
degree of altruism), and in turn transfer less. The current parents, in anticipation of this
change, will rationally expect a lower return on child investment, since the distribution of
the transfer rate from children moves leftwards, and respond by having fewer kids. This
channel will take effect gradually and it is hard to verify whether parents are forward-
looking and whether such expectation shifts have happened. We will deal with this issue
in the sensitivity analysis part.
In sum, considering all the four possible channels, we see that social insurance may
have an ambiguous effect, with the price and income effects pushing up the fertility rate
while liquidity constraint and social attitude changes pulling down the TFR.
However we do see in reality that there is an obvious downward trend in fertility
over the past few decades. If social insurance’s effect is ambiguous, what are other factors
that contribute to the decline in TFR? We propose that factors closely related to the rate of
return on child investment (i.e. the cost and rewards of childbearing) are responsible. One
factor is that as economy develops and living standard rises, the cost of raising children
increases. The other factor is that people may predict that the aggregate economic growth
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will slow down12. Both factors imply that children’s value in terms of investment return
will decline13. Thus, people tend to have fewer kids and allocate extra resources to saving,
transfer or consumption.
2.3 Calibration
In this part we calibrate our model under two scenarios (with and without social
insurance), to match the TFR in China in 1985 (when social insurance system was ab-
sent) and in 2005 (when the government has undertaken a series of structural reforms
to the pension system). This 20-year gap14 also facilitates our overlapping generation
framework.
China’s national social insurance program was launched around 1993. Before that,
the period 1950-1978 was characterized by two anomalous events—the Great Famine and
the 10-year Cultural Revolution. Both have had major impacts on the economy as well
as on fertility, especially the Great Famine. Beginning in 1979, the government adopted
the “reform and opening-up” policy and the economy experienced dramatic changes in
the early 1980s. For all these reasons, we choose the TFR in year 1985 as the empirical
target for the scenario without insurance. After the 1993’s launching, various policy re-
forms took place to the social insurance programs, and by 2005 the system has stabilized.
12To have a snapshot on this hypothesis, we find that US real GDP grew at 6.34% in 1935-1939, 5.98%
in 1940-1949, 4% during 1950-60s, dropped to 3% in the last three decades of the 20th century, and was
only 2.33% between 2000 and 2008. During the same period, the TFR falls from around 3.0 in the 1930s
to the current level of 2.06, a decline of 30%.
13Based on our assumption that Dt+1 = dt+1wt+1W t+1 and the growth in average wage is equal to
GDP growth, even if the distribution of dt+1 does not shift leftwards, an expected decrease in GDP growth
will lead to a smaller W t+1, which then lowers Dt+1.
14Throughout the calibration, we assume that a period is 20 years which may be a bit away from the
realistic setting, i.e 40 years of working and 20 years of retirement.
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Therefore, our calibration target for the scenario with social insurance is the TFR in 2005.
2.3.1 Parameter Choices
For all the parameters, we summarize their values in Table 2.1. Since we calibrate
our model to two different years (1985 and 2005), there are four generations in our cali-
brations, i.e. 1965, 1985, 2005, and 2025.
First, we provide formal justifications for those parameters related to child invest-
ment. Childbearing cost consists of two parts: a fixed cost (a) and an income-varying cost
(bWt). For the fixed cost a, we assume it is around 5% of the average income, i.e. one-
year’s average income. With regard to the income-varying part, Echevarria and Merlo
(1999) find that cost to a woman of having a child is about 5% of her working lifetime,
while according to Juster and Stafford (1991), hours per week allocated on childcare ac-
count for between 6.43% and 18% of parents total available time. In China, children are
heavily dependent on parents’ support at least before marriage. In order to capture this
characteristic, we set b as 10%. In terms of child investment rewards, we assume that
children’s transfer rate follows a Beta distribution (dt+1 ∼ Beta(αd, βd)) and the mean
(Et[dt+1]) is 12.5%.
Second, since we solve our model in a partial equilibrium framework, we need to
set appropriate values for interest rates, income levels, etc. across periods. (1) R1985 and
R2005 are computed as the products of annual real gross interest rate for 1966-1985 and
1986-200515. And one might conjecture that the real interest rate will stay at a relatively
15The real interest rates are calculated from nominal rates and inflation rates asR = 1+r = (1+i)/(1+
π), where r is net real interest rate, π inflation and i nominal rate. The inflation rates are available from
1980 to 2008, and are assumed to be 0 from 1950 to 1979, a time when Chinese economy almost stagnated.
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low level between 2006 and 2025, so we assume R2025 = (1 + 1%)20. (2) Using his-
torical data, we calculate the real GDP growth rate, and use it to approximate the real
income growth between 1966 and 1985 as well as between 1986 and 2005. In addition,
we pick 6% as annual GDP growth during 2006-2025, accounting for the recent financial
crisis. (3) W t+s,∀s ∈ {−1, 0, 1} are the average labor income: we normalize W t = 1
and set W t−1 = W t/gt and W t+1 = gt+1W t, where gt and gt+1 are real GDP growth
rate for the current and next period. (4) Within each period, we define relative income
(wt+s,i,∀s ∈ {−1, 0, 1}) as the ratio of individual income to average level. There is a
cross-sectional distribution of this relative income: w1985,i follows the empirical income
distribution for year 1985, w2005,i for year 2005. Due to data limitation, w1965,i is assumed
to follow the same distribution as w1985,i16. Since income distribution is moving slowly
and it is difficult for parents to make an accurate conjecture, we assume a static expecta-
tion: parents believe that the distribution of the next generation’s income will be identical
to the income distribution in their own generation. Based on this, w2025,i has the same
distribution as w2005,i. The details are shown in Table 2.2.
Third, the utility is set as the natural logarithm function; the intertemporal discount
factor is set as δ = 0.9920. In addition we also need a value for η (parents’ attention on
grandparents’ utility). As expected, there is no direct data measuring this; and it should
vary across countries and even households. Boldrin et al. (2005) calibrate their model
using η = 0.185 for England. Here we set it as 0.5, since under the Confucian doctrine,
The calculated net real interest rate between 1966 and 1985 is around 90%, while it is slightly negative for
the period 1986-2005.
16The earliest income distribution data we could obtain is for year 1995, which is used to approximate
the cross sectional distribution of labor income in 1985. Because of a series of disruptions, the income
distribution did not change much from 1965 to 1985.
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Chinese people tend to care more about their elderly parents’ old-age life.
Fourth, we don’t have data on child mortality rate between age 0 and 19. However,
according to the World Development Indicators database by the World Bank, the mortality
under age 5 per 1,000 live births is around 45 in 1995 and 25 in 2005. We conjecture that
the mortality rate between age 0 and 19 should be fairly close to the mortality rate under
age 5. Therefore, we pick a moderate value 5% for our calibration exercises.
Fifth, social insurance benefit reflects a combination of minimum living expenses
and personal contribution history. The minimum pension is a small percentage of average
income level and the contribution-based benefit is positively related to individual contri-
bution history. From year 2000 onwards, Chinese workers contributed on average 8% of
their incomes to the social insurance trust fund. We further assume the minimum pension
ratio is 10%. Due to this setting, a balanced government budget constraint requires that
the marginal pension increase should always be less than 1 for one more dollar’s tax pay-
ment, and thus we set the value of this coefficient to be 0.8. We also suppose middle-age
people between 1966 and 1985 were not covered by any pension system, and that the
expected social insurance tax rate for 2005-2025 remains at 8%17.
Finally, in terms of the two state variables—TFR and saving rate in the previous
period, we use historical data in the 1960s and 1980s when matching the 1985 and 2005
fertility rates, respectively. In particular, we approximate the saving rate of the middle-age
people by household saving rate in Modigliani and Cao (2004).
17With the rise in the aged dependency ratio, it is expected that the social insurance tax rate might increase
in the future. And we will deal with its effect in the sensitivity analysis part.
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2.3.2 Calibration Results
Before showing our results, we briefly discuss the calibration procedures. There are
three dimensions of heterogeneity here: income of parents Wt,i, grandparents Wt−1,j , and
the expected income distribution of kids Wt+1,k. First, we solve individual maximization
models with different fertility choices for each combination of (i, j, k). Second, by com-
paring the expected life-time utility when ft = 0, 1, 2, 3, we obtain the optimal fertility
decision for each income combination pair. Third, we aggregate the individual fertility
choices over dimension k, then over j and finally over i, which leads to a society-wide
TFR, corresponding to a particular setting on social insurance.
The stylized fact we aim at matching is TFR, which equals 2.60 in 1985’s China and
1.80 in 2005, as computed from the World Development Indicators database by the World
Bank. Calibrated from the model without social insurance, the weighted average of TFR
is 2.55 which is quite close to its empirical counterpart. And the society-wide average
private saving rate is 0.56%18 and people on average transfer 19.76% of their income to
elderly parents.
The calibration results for 2005 China is also encouraging. Without applying the
liquidity constraint, the calibrated TFR is 1.96 kids with -8.9% private saving19 and
23.72% transfer rates from adults to their elderly parents when social insurance is in
place. When the liquidity constraint is turned on, the calibrated TFR drops to 1.27 kids
18The calibrated 0.56% saving rate in 1985 is too small as compared to that from Modigliani and Cao
(2004) where the saving rate is around 15%. This is because parents in our model invest a lot in children,
whose transfers will substitute, to a great extent, the role of saving for retirement. Another reason is our
utility setting: the natural logarithm implies a relative risk aversion parameter of 1, while it is commonly
estimated to be 3-5 from micro level data. As expected, the more risk averse, the more the households will
save.
19Combining the private saving and the mandatory social insurance saving, the total saving rate is around
11.62%.
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with a significant decrease in private saving rate to 6.99% and a relatively stable transfer
rate of 22.75%. Although banks normally do not accept pension benefits as collateral,
various borrowing channels exist such as from relatives and friends. The liquidity con-
straint may be binding for some people, but not for others. We find that the average TFR
from the models with and without liquidity constraint is around 1.60 kids, which is not
far away from the values we observed in the data.
In addition, we find that our calibrations match the declining tendency in TFR and
the increasing trend in private saving as Chinese economy develops. However, the decline
in TFR seems to contradict our discussion of the price and income effect of social insur-
ance. Hence, we are interested in examining whether our calibration results are consistent
with the predictions from our theoretical framework; if so, what are the factors (outside
the social insurance program) that contribute to the decline in TFR from 1985 to 2005.
We provide a detailed analysis of our calibration results by decomposing and comparing
outcomes under various hypothetical environments in the next part.
2.3.3 Analysis of Calibration Results
Comparing the calibrated TFR between 1985 and 2005 can not give us a clear an-
swer on the effect of social insurance on fertility since many other factors also change
during this period. To distinguish the impact of social insurance from that of other fac-
tors, we calibrate the model under hypothetical environments such as the presence of
social insurance in 1985 and the absence of it in 2005. The calibrated results are summa-
rized in Table 2.3. The dark gray cells represent the actual scenarios, while the light gray
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ones reflect the hypothetical environments.
First, we suppose parents in 1985 were covered by the social insurance program
and calibrate the model using parameter values corresponding to the 1985 economy. It
is clear that, other things equal, the combination of the price and income effect of social
insurance increases TFR from 2.55 to 2.82, a net change of 0.27, which is consistent
with our discussion that increased life-time income and reduced childbearing cost induce
people to have more children by running a negative private saving at the current period.
However, if people can not borrow against their future pension benefits, calibrated TFR
drops from 2.82 to 2.10, indicating a substantial effect of liquidity constraints on reducing
fertility.
Second, we assume parents in 2005 were not covered by the social insurance pro-
gram. The calibrated TFR is 1.80, which can be compared with 1.96 under the scenario
with social insurance in 2005. Once again, this shows that the combined price and in-
come effect of social insurance is positive. When we add the liquidity constraint, the TFR
falls to 1.27, confirming the substantial effect of this constraint under the 2005 parameter
combination.
In sum, Table 2.3 gives us a good example to understand the effect of social insur-
ance on TFR. Although the price and income effects and the impact of liquidity constraint
are consistent with our predictions, they, themselves, can not explain the big drop in the
calibrated TFR from 1985 to 2005. Looking at Table 2.3 vertically, we see that the 2005
parameter combination generates lower TFRs than the 1985 one, whatever we impose
social insurance or not. Factors other than social insurance may play a dominating role in
reducing the TFR over time.
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As documented in Table 2.1 and 2.2, a set of parameters change their values from
1985 to 2005, including the real interest rate (Rt+1 and Rt), GDP growth rate (gt and
gt+1), TFR and saving rate in the previous period (ft−1 and st−1), and income distribution
of parents (wt). In order to examine the effect of each factor, we calibrate the model
under several hypothetical environments: each time only one parameter changes its value
to reflect the 2005 economy, while all the other parameters take their values in 1985. A
summary of this comparative statics exercise is reported in Table 2.4.
The first parameter is Rt+1, i.e. the real interest rate on private savings between
period t and t+ 1. The change in this parameter value affects the interest income parents
will receive when they become old. From Table 2.1, R2025 is higher thanR2005, indicating
a rise in the rate of return on private savings, which will induce a higher private saving
rate and a lower fertility. Our result confirms this argument: the TFR drops from 2.55 to
2.49, with an increase in the average saving rate from 0.56% to 1.42%.
The second parameter is gt+1, i.e. the expected GDP growth rate in period t+1. This
parameter matters because it is used to calculate the society-wide average income W t+1,
which in turn affects the expected child transfer for everyone (Dt+1 = dt+1wt+1W t+1).
Historical data shows that the annual real GDP growth rate is more than 9% during the
period 1986-2005. However, due to the recent financial crisis, we think it is very hard
for China to keep growing at such a high speed for the next 20 years. A less impressive
long-run economic growth translates into a lower growth of the average income, and
thereby a reduced rate of return on child investment and an expected drop in fertility. Our
calibration shows a relatively large drop in TFR from 2.55 to 2.21 kids.
The third parameter we examine is gt, which is used to compute the average in-
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come in the previous period (W t−1 = W t/(1 + gt)). Since Chinese economy grew at
a higher speed during the period 1986-2005 than 1966-1985, the average grandparents’
income calculated using g2005 is lower than the one using g1985. This means grandparents
would become poorer, which would induce a higher transfer. When parents transfer more
resources to their elderly parents, fewer resources are left at current period and we expect
to see a drop in both saving and fertility. However, since the difference between g2005 and
g1985 is small and it does not affect the rate of return on child investment, the calibrated
fertility rate remains roughly the same and the changes in transfer and saving are trivial.
The fourth parameter we are interested in is ft−1, i.e. the state variable indicating
the number of siblings of parents. China’s TFR in 1965 was 6.08 kids, but this number
decreased dramatically to 2.60 in 1985. According to eq. (2.10), where we assume co-
operative transfer game among siblings, there is a positive relationship between optimal
transfer rate and the number of siblings. Our calibration shows that when ft−1 becomes
smaller, dt drops from 19.76% to 19.24%, with TFR unchanged.
The fifth parameter we look at is Rtst−1, which measures grandparents’ saving bal-
ances. Everything else equal, a higher Rtst−1 represents richer grandparents. Rationally,
parents should transfer less to their elderly parents and use the extra resources to save or
to raise children. From 1966-1985 to 1986-2005, Rt decreased by a small amount, but
the average saving rate increased from 5% to 15%, thus grandparents became richer. Our
calibration results reveal that the effect of grandparents’ financial position is quite limited
in that parents only decrease their transfer by a tiny percentage. Naturally, since Rtst−1
does not directly affect the rate of return on child investment, there is no change in the
calibrated TFR.
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The final one is income distribution among the current generation of parents, where
the gap between poor and rich people enlarges significantly from 1985 to 2005. Our
calibration results indicate that TFR decreases while both saving and transfer rates rise.
We will have a detailed discussion of the relationship between parents’ income position
and their fertility decisions in the heterogeneity analysis part below.
2.4 Heterogeneity Analysis
The effect of social insurance is not uniform across the population. In this part we
show that the heterogeneous effects of social insurance depend largely on one’s position in
the income distribution. We focus on the dimension of parents’ income (Wt): normalize
the average income (i.e. W t = 1), and assume relative income ranges from 10% to 6
times of the average. All the other parameter values remain the same as in the above
calibrated models.
Different from the benchmark calibration, we only aggregate the individual fertil-
ity choices over the dimensions of expected kids’ and grandparents’ income to obtain a
series of weighted average TFRs corresponding to each grid point in parents’ income dis-
tribution. In addition, we also calibrate our model under a hypothetical scenario, where
both parents and grandparents were not covered by the social insurance program in 2005.
Thus, a comparison between the outcome from the hypothetical scenario and that from
the actual one helps us to single out the impact of social insurance.
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2.4.1 Total Fertility Rate
Figure 2.1 describes the optimal fertility choices across parents’ income. The blue
line is the calibrated TFR for 1985, which can be regarded as a baseline scenario. The
green line represents the optimal fertility choices under the hypothetical scenario that both
parents and grandparents were not covered by the program in 2005. The orange and the
purple lines are results when social insurance is in place. The orange line indicates the
price and income effect, while the purple one shows how TFR changes if parents face
liquidity constraints.
One common feature across all these scenarios is: starting from the lowest income
percentile, fertility rate increases as income rises; however this trend reverses when in-
come is above a threshold level20. The negative relationship between TFR and income
when Wt > W t, is consistent with previous literature that when parents become rich,
the income-varying cost of childbearing becomes higher, which prohibits some of them
from raising children. The smaller fertility rate among the poor is because they don’t have
enough resources to bear the fixed cost of raising children.
Besides the above common feature, there are dramatic differences among these sce-
narios. First, comparing the blue line with the green one, we find that for every income
level, TFR under the hypothetical scenario is lower than that under the baseline scenario,
indicating a consistent effect of other factors (such as expected long-run economic growth
and interest rate) on reducing TFR from 1985 to 2005. Moreover, the magnitude of the
differences between these two scenarios enlarges when parents’ income rises, which sug-
20The threshold level is roughly equal to the society average income, although it shifts slightly across
different scenarios.
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gests that rich people may be more sensitive to changes in other contributing factors.
For example, the difference is only 0.05 for people earning 0.2W t and less than 1.0 if
parents’ income is within [0.1, 1.3]W t; but the gap increases to 1.8 kids when people
earn [3.0, 4.1]W t. Second, comparing the green with the orange line, we see vividly the
combined price and income effect of social insurance on fertility. On the one hand, for
relatively poor people, the price and income effects reinforce each other and push up the
TFR. In Figure 2.1, for people whose income is within [0.1, 1.1]W t, TFR in the presence
of social insurance is higher than that in the absence of social insurance. On the other
hand, changes in fertility rate among relatively rich people depend on which of the two
effects dominates. According to Figure 2.1, we observe a weak dominance of the income
effect in that for parents earning [1.2, 6.0]W t, TFR with social insurance is lower than or
equal to the one without social insurance. Third, the impact of the liquidity constraint
is quite clear by comparing the orange with the purple line. If people can not borrow
against their future pension benefits, their current period resources shrink after tax pay-
ments, which induces a lower fertility rate. This effect is particularly significant for the
poor. For example, people earning 0.1W t choose not to have children if they can’t borrow
against their future pension benefits; but instead raise 1.3 kids if this liquidity constraint
is absent. The magnitude of this effect diminishes when peoples’ income rises. That is, if
their income is sufficiently high, this constraint will not bind and thus have no impact on
their fertility.
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2.4.2 Average Saving Rate
According to our model, parents face two basic decisions: consumption and in-
vestment. The former one is divided into consumption of themselves and transfer to
their elderly parents; while the latter one is divided into investment in children which is
risky and in risk-free private savings, plus some mandatory social insurance contributions.
Based on our previous discussion, the price effect of social insurance lowers the cost of
childbearing, which induces an increase in the rate of return on child investment. Simi-
larly, other factors such as expected long-run GDP growth and interest rate also affect the
rewards on child investment. Since saving and fertility are close substitutes for parents in
our model, we are interested to see whether saving behavior changes in an opposite way
as compared to the fertility.
Figure 2.2 shows the average private saving rate as a function of parents’ income.
As expected, people tend to save more when their income rises. A comparison between
the baseline scenario (the blue line) and the hypothetical scenario without social insurance
in 2005 (the green line) indicates that the saving rate of the poor stagnates around 0.1%,
while private saving among the rich increases significantly in response to the big drop
in TFR as seen in Figure 2.1. What’s more, there are two other notable observations
when social insurance is in place. First, according to the orange line, relatively poor
people whose income is less than 1.1W t have great incentives to borrow against their
future pension benefits to raise children, reflected as the negative private saving rate at
the current period. However, this borrowing incentive diminishes quickly when parents’
income rises above the society average, indicating the loss of interest in borrowing as a
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result of a decline in the rate of return on child investment for the rich. Second, when the
liquidity constraint is applied, everyone’s saving rate is positive, but the value is lower
than the one without social insurance because people have fewer resources left after tax
payments.
2.4.3 Transfer Rate
The third variable of potential interest is the transfer from the middle-age people
to their elderly parents, which measures the cross-generational linkages between adult
children and elderly parents.
Given our model specification, decisions on investment and consumption can be
separated. Within consumption, because of logarithm utility, parents are maximizing a
Cobb-Douglas aggregation of their own and their elderly parents’ consumption21. There-
fore, if there is no uncertainty in child investment, transfer and consumption each occupies
a fixed proportion of the total expenditure. It is then quite natural to see a convergence in
the transfer rate for people earning above average income, and some dynamics for peo-
ple whose consumption decisions are affected by precautionary motive in the absence of
social insurance and by pension benefit generosity in the presence of such an income re-
distribution program. From Figure 2.3, when parents’ income is above the average, the
transfer rate stabilizes around 20% without social insurance coverage; and around 23%
with the coverage22.
21This is because
log[Cmt ] + β log[C
o
t+1] + η log[C
o










22The transfer rate is defined as a percentage of disposable income. So a 23% transfer rate with social
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From Figure 2.2, private saving rate in the presence of social insurance is always
smaller than that without the program. With the mandatory social insurance saving, par-
ents’ burden to save enough resources for their own elderly life due to the precautionary
saving motive lessens so that they can transfer more resources to their elderly parents,
which helps explain the higher convergence level in transfer when social insurance is in
place. In addition, although some factors consistently affect the rate of return on child
investment and thus on fertility, they have almost no impact on transfer behavior when
comparing the 1985 baseline with the hypothetical scenarios. This is another confirma-
tion that fertility and private saving are close substitutes.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Broadly speaking, the main factor that affects fertility rates is the rate of return
on child investment, which could be decomposed into the childbearing cost (a + bWt)
and the expected transfer from children (Dt+1). First, since we do not have data to mea-
sure the fixed and income-varying costs of raising children, parents’ degree of altruism
towards grandparents, and the distribution of children’s transfers, we make somewhat ar-
bitrary assumptions on related parameters and suppose that their values did not change be-
tween 1985 and 2005. However, we conjecture that there might exist an increasing trend
of childbearing cost in reality and the cost itself may be heterogeneous across income
groups. Therefore, we provide sensitivity analysis on both the fixed and income-varying
costs to show their impacts on fertility choices.
Second, based on our discussion of the channels through which social insurance can
insurance is roughly equal to 21%(= 23%× (1− 8%)) of pre-tax income.
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affect fertility, we consider the price and income effects as well as the liquidity constraint
channel explicitly in our calibration exercises and heterogeneous analysis. However, in
terms of potential changes in social attitudes that the degree of altruism may decrease and
parents may expect a lower children’s transfer rate in the presence of social insurance,
it is hard to tell whether social attitude changes have already taken place, and if so, to
measure the magnitude of the changes. In order to shed lights on the potential impact of
this channel on fertility, we simulate our models under hypothetical scenarios that either
η or dt+1 (Et[dt+1]) changes its value in 2005.
Third, social insurance program is not stationary over time and due to the progress
of an aging society, it is expected that the social insurance tax rates will rise to raise more
funds from the working generation in order to support the retired generation. The changes
in social insurance tax rates will alter both the opportunity cost of childbearing and the ex-
pected life-time income. Boldrin et al. (2005) show that more than 50% of the differences
in TFR between US and European countries can be explained by the differences in social
insurance programs. They also find a significantly negative relationship between TFR
and the social insurance tax rates. Thus, we are interested to see whether this relationship
holds in China and whether Chinese parents are sensitive to the tax rate changes.
2.5.1 Childbearing Cost
In our benchmark calibration, we assume the fixed cost of raising a child equals
one year’s average income (i.e. a = 0.05). Here, we consider two candidate values of a
to examine its effect on fertility. The simulated TFRs across parents’ income distribution
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are displayed in Figure 2.4.
The blue line represents the 1985 benchmark scenario and the green line shows
the results in the presence of social insurance in 2005. The orange and the purple lines
are simulated TFRs under two hypothetical scenarios when the fixed cost of childbearing
increases to two year’s or four year’s average income (i.e. a = 0.1, or 0.2). It is clear
that TFR is negatively correlated with the fixed cost and poor peoples’ fertility rates are
more sensitive to changes in the fixed cost. For example, for people earning 0.1W t, they
choose to have 1.3 kids when the fixed cost equals one year’s average income; however,
this number decreases to 0.6 if the fixed cost doubles; and it further drops to 0 if the fixed
cost rises to four years’ average income. By contrast, rich peoples’ fertility rates are not
affected much by this kind of change; the magnitude in TFR decline is less than 0.5 when
people earn more than 3 times the average.
Regarding the income-varying cost, we treat it as 10% of parents’ income Wt in
the baseline scenario, and then increase it to 15% and 20%. We also find a negative
relationship between simulated TFRs and the income-varying cost in Figure 2.5, but this
negative relationship is different from the one between TFR and the fixed cost in several
aspects. First, relatively poor people are not so sensitive to the changes in b. For people
earning [0.1, 0.5]W t, the difference in TFRs is less than 1.0 when b increases from 10%
to 20%. The poorest people still choose to have 0.9 kids, while we notice that they will
choose not to have children when a rises from one year’s to four year’s average income.
Second, changes in TFR for relatively rich people are more pronounced. For those whose
incomes are within the range of [0.6, 2.7]W t, the decline in TFR is larger than 1.0. Third,
we find that when couples’ income is higher than 3.2W t, they choose not to have children
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if the income-varying cost rises to 20%. This result provides a supporting evidence for
the low fertility rate among the rich: the high income-varying cost prohibits some of them
from having children.
2.5.2 Potential Changes in Social Attitudes
The potential changes in social attitudes are twofold: one is parents’ degree of
altruism towards their elderly parents (η) may decrease; the other is parents expect that the
distribution of their children’s transfer rate may move leftwards. First, we consider two
candidate values for η (η = 0.35, or 0.20) to examine how peoples’ fertility rates change
if they do not pay as much attention to their parents as before. Second, based on our
assumption that transfer rate dt+1 follows a Beta distribution (i.e. dt+1 ∼ Beta(αd, βd)),
we modify the value for βd so that the average transfer rate declines from the original
12.5% to 10% or 8%.
The simulated TFRs under various η values are shown in Figure 2.6. For people
earning [0.1, 0.7]W t, when η declines, TFR increases by a small amount. However, when
parents’ income is higher than 0.7W t, there is almost no change in TFR when η drops
from 0.5 to 0.2, which is a little bit surprising.
In order to explain this observation, we need to look at the changes in optimal trans-
fer rate dt when η decreases. Since η represents how grandparents’ utility is viewed by
parents, a smaller η means the same amount of transfer brings less rewards (i.e. utility) to
parents23. Figure 2.7(a) illustrates the interactions between η and dt that when η declines
23This can be proven in eq. (2.10), from which we can derive that ∂dt∂η > 0. This shows a positive
relationship between parents’ altruism degree η and their optimal transfer rate dt.
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from 0.5 to 0.2, everyone’s transfer declines and thus the transfer rate converges to a much
lower level at around 10% compared to the previous 23%. At the same time, from Figure
2.7(b), when η falls, the private saving rate does not change for those whose incomes are
within [0.1, 0.7]W t, but rises significantly for people earning [0.8, 6.0]W t. Combining
Figure 2.7(a) and 2.7(b), a decline in η directly reduces the transfers from the middle-age
people to their elderly parents, while how they allocate the extra resources depends on
the comparison in the rate of return between risky child investment and risk-free private
saving. For relatively poor people, rate of return on fertility is higher than that on saving
so that we observe an increase in TFR; by contrast, relatively rich people see higher return
on saving than on fertility, which induces an increase in st instead.
In contrast to the minor change in TFR when η declines, TFR decreases signifi-
cantly when the mean expected old-age transfer from children declines. In Figure 2.8,
when dt+1 falls from 12.5% to 8%, the simulated TFRs decline for everyone, although
the magnitudes are different depending on parents’ income position. For people earning
[0.1, 0.5]W t or [2.8, 6.0]W t, the simulated TFR only changes a small amount (less than
0.5) even if dt+1 drops by nearly 40%. However, people earning [0.6, 2.7]W t are quite
sensitive to changes in dt+1. For example, for people earning average income, their TFR
drops from 2.4 to 1.15, when dt+1 decreases from 12.5% to 8%.
2.5.3 Social Insurance Tax Rate
Due to the rapid development of an aging society, the aged dependency ratio rises
dramatically in China. In a “pay-as-you-go” system, a challenging question is how to
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ensure that this program is sustainable in the long run24. There are two options: one is
to increase the social insurance tax rates; the other is to cut benefits. In light of this, we
simulate our model under hypothetical assumptions of higher social insurance tax rates
and examine peoples’ reactions in fertility.
As expected, an increase in social insurance tax rates can affect fertility through





for everyone; according to the price effect, this may induce a higher fertility rate.
Second, the income effect of a rise in αt is slightly complicated. Our specification
on social insurance benefits consists of two parts: one is called “minimum pension” which
is a small percentage (γt) of the average income level W t; the other varies with workers’
contribution. One important parameter is βt, which can be viewed as “marginal actuarial
fairness index”—the marginal pension increase for one more dollar’s tax payment. To
fund the minimum pension, it is necessary for the administration to impose a βt less than
1. Such design of social insurance implies that poor people will get a better deal than the
rich: the government-provided social insurance is an income redistribution from the rich
to the poor. The net benefit from social insurance could be written as:
Net Benefit at t =
Benefit at t+ 1
Rt+1
− Contribution at t (2.16)
= γtW t + βtαt(1− bft)Wt − αt(1− bft)Wt (2.17)
= γtW t − (1− βt)αt(1− bft)Wt (2.18)
24In our partial equilibrium framework, we do not explicitly specify a dynamic budget constraint for
the government. In practice, with overlapping generations, there are arguments for a PAYG pension such
as efficiency gains and intergenerational redistribution. However, there are tensions when the ratio of the
number of contributors to the number of retirees decreases, which justify a need to raise taxes.
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A threshold level of income (W ∗t ), where the contribution to and the benefit from the





For families with income higher than the threshold level, the program reduces their present
discounted life-time income; and vice versa for people with income below the threshold
level. Given ft fixed, eq. (2.18) implies a negative relationship between the net benefit
and αt. Hence a rise in αt will reduce the net benefit for everyone (both the rich and the
poor), and lead to a smaller W ∗t . Therefore we expect to see a lower ft since children are
normal goods. However this is not the end of the story: given αt fixed, eq. (2.18) implies
a positive relationship between the net benefit and ft. An initial decline in ft due to an
increase in αt will further reduce the net benefit, and thus leads to another decline in ft.
Figure 2.9 shows the decomposition of the interactions between αt and ft. The
purple line in 2.9(a) refers to the contribution as a function of income, and the blue one
the benefit function. Hence, the gap between them constitutes the net benefit function as
in 2.9(b), which is positive for Wt < W ∗t and negative for Wt > W
∗
t . When the social
insurance tax rate increases from 8% to 12%, with ft fixed, we see that the slopes of both
the purple and the blue lines increase, but due to βt < 1, the slope increase in the benefit
function is smaller. This translates into a downward movement of the net benefit function,
as displayed by the black dashed line in Figure 2.9(b). This represents a decline in the
lifetime income for everyone (except for those with Wt = 0), and the direct income effect
says people should demand fewer kids.
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There is a further reaction in the model: with αt now fixed at its new value, a
smaller ft induces higher slopes for both the contribution and the benefit functions, which
in turn leads to an even lower net benefit function, as reflected in the black thin line in
Figure 2.9(b). The second round of income effect will further reduce fertility. In the end,
families respond to a higher social insurance tax rate by having fewer kids. The economy
is characterized by high taxation and generous pension benefit (see the purple and blue
thin lines in 2.9(a)), which resembles what we observe in those European welfare states.
It is interesting to note the difference in the income effect between introducing
social insurance into the economy and raising tax rates within an existing system. In the
former case, income effect is positive for the poor and negative for the rich. However,
in the latter case, the income effect from a rise in αt is negative for everyone earning a
positive income. Combining this with the positive price effect, we must turn to calibration
exercise to see how ft responds.
We simulate our model under hypothetical scenarios that the current social insur-
ance tax rate increases from 8% to 12% or 16%. Figure 2.10 shows that the magnitude of
TFR reduction with respect to an increase in αt is trivial, indicating an offsetting between
the price and income effect.
Finally, we briefly discuss the effect of an increase in expected future tax rate αt+1.
This expectation change may happen if couples, for example baby boomers, anticipate a
decline in the ratio of workers to beneficiaries next period. An increased future tax rate
means a lower rate of return in child investment from the view of parents. Thus, parents
will choose to have fewer kids, which reinforces their initial expectation of a smaller
population size and a higher tax rate αt+1.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper quantified the effect of social insurance on total fertility rate (TFR)
through macro aggregation based on solving individual dynamic fertility choice model.
From parents’ point of view investment in children is risky and the risks are twofold: (1)
whether a kid can grow up, represented by the infant mortality rate; (2) uncertainty about
the transfer parents expect to get when they become old.
We examined the effect of social insurance on fertility rate from four perspectives.
First, we considered the price effect due to payment of social insurance taxes, which
decreases the opportunity cost of childbearing and thereby induces higher fertility. Sec-
ond, we considered the income effect that this income-redistribution program has, which
raises the expected life-time income for relatively poor people, while decreasing life-time
income of the rich. Since children are viewed as normal goods, there is a positive re-
lationship between life-time income and fertility. Combining these two effects, we find
that low-earning people tend to have more kids since the two effects work in the same
direction, while changes among high-income people depend on which of these effects
dominates. Our heterogeneous analysis indicates that the income effect dominates for
relatively rich people so that their fertility rate declines in the presence of the program.
The third factor we considered is the liquidity constraint caused by the need to pay
the social insurance taxes, which reduces current cash-on-hand for everyone. Although
it is possible to borrow through informal channels, this liquidity constraint plays an im-
portant role in affecting fertility choices. Comparing scenarios with and without this
constraint, we find that social insurance causes average TFR to drop significantly. Specif-
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ically, the fertility rate among the lowest earners where the taxes are most likely to cause
binding liquidity constraint experiences the biggest decline.
The final aspect we took into account is the potential change in social attitudes,
which is reflected in a decrease in either parents’ altruism degree towards their elderly
parents or expected transfers from their children. On the one hand, these changes in social
attitudes were not addressed in previous literature. On the other hand, it is quite hard to
examine whether this kind of change already happened after the social insurance program
was introduced, and even harder to measure the magnitude of this change. In light of
this, we used sensitivity analysis and simulated our model based on various candidate
parameter values. Our results show that fertility rates are quite sensitive to changes in
expectation of children’s transfer rate; a 20% decrease will induce 10-70% drop in fertility
rate depending on parents’ position in the income distribution. In addition, a smaller
degree of altruism induces less transfer from adult children to elderly parents in a direct
and significant way. However, comparing the rate of return on private saving and child
investment, people have heterogeneous choices in allocating the extra resources on either
fertility or saving.
In contrast to Boldrin et al. (2005), who showed that at least 50% of the differences
in TFR between US and European countries can be explained by the differences in the
generosity of social insurance, we have shown that a more generous social insurance pro-
gram has a trivial effect on the fertility rate in China. Beyond this, our calibration results
match quite well with the declining tendency in TFR from 1985 to 2005. Decomposing
the calibrated TFRs reveals that the combination of price and income effect of social in-
surance has a slightly positive impact on TFR, while imposing liquidity constraints could
118
decrease fertility rate by around 35%. Moreover, the decomposition brings out an impor-
tant feature that factors related with the rate of return on child investment and private sav-
ing always matter when people are making fertility choices. Any changes in these factors
have a direct effect on fertility rate, although the magnitude may vary across scenarios.
Our calibrations show that, without consideration of liquidity constraint, the big drop in
TFR from 1985 to 2005 is, to a large extent, due to changes in expected GDP growth rate
and interest rates, which affect the average income in the children’s generation and thus
the future retirement income for their parents. In a similar spirit, we show that increases
in childbearing costs also have significant effect on reducing fertility rate, although low-
income people are more sensitive to changes in the fixed cost while high-income people
are more sensitive to changes in the income-varying part.
There are many extensions to this work that could provide further insights on the
effect of social insurance on fertility. First, our model is calibrated to match TFR in
China between 1985 and 2005. Besides China, we observe a world-wide decreasing
trend in TFR from the 1960s. It is interesting and important we calibrate the models to
match other countries’ TFRs during the same period. By doing this, we could have a
better understanding of whether the same framework can be used among other countries,
whether the effect of increasing tax rate on fertility is still limited, and whether those
factors related to the rate of return on child investment also play an important role in
other countries. Cross-country comparisons could help answer all these questions and
provide a more comprehensive explanations on how the social insurance program affects
peoples’ fertility choices. Second, although our calibrations match actual TFR reasonably
well, we make arbitrary assumptions about some key parameter values such as the cost
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for raising children, the expected transfer rate, and parents’ degree of altruism. It would
be better if we could utilize micro-level data and empirically estimate these parameters by
matching moments from simulations to the data. I leave these extensions for future work.
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Table 2.1: Benchmark Parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Macro Economy
Number of years per period T 20
Risk-free real interest rate 1966-1985 R1985 1.889
Risk-free real interest rate 1986-2005 R2005 0.940
Risk-free real interest rate 2006-2025 R2025 1.220
GDP growth rate 1966-1985 g1985 2.067
GDP growth rate 1986-2005 g2005 5.213
GDP growth rate 2006-2025 g2025 2.207
Average labor income at period t W t 1.000
Preferences
Discount factor δ 0.818
Parents altruism towards grandparents η 0.500
Child Investment
Mortality rate between age 0 and 19 p 0.050
Childbearing cost: fixed part a 0.050
Childbearing cost: income-varying part b 0.100
Beta Distribution for transfer rate α 2.000
β 14.000
Social Insurance
Marginal tax rate αt 0.080
Actuarial fairness index βt 0.800
Minimal pension ratio γt 0.100
State Variables
Grandparents’ total fertility rate in 1965 f1965 6.080
Grandparents’ total fertility rate in 1985 f1985 2.600
Grandparents’ private saving rate in 1965 s1965 0.050
Grandparents’ private saving rate in 1985 s1985 0.150
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Table 2.2: Relative Income Distribution for Calibration
Percentile 0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 81-90% 91-100%
Proposed w1965 0.4629 0.5528 0.6480 0.7844 0.9500 1.1563 1.4077 1.9196
w1985 0.4629 0.5528 0.6480 0.7844 0.9500 1.1563 1.4077 1.9196
w2005 0.2414 0.3553 0.4595 0.6340 0.8733 1.2010 1.6507 2.7593
Means of w2025 0.2414 0.3553 0.4595 0.6340 0.8733 1.2010 1.6507 2.7593
Table 2.3: Calibrated TFR and Private Saving Rate under Hypothetical Environments
SINo SIYes SIYes+LC Price & Income Effect Liquidity Constraint Effect
1985 TFR 2.55 2.82 2.10 0.27 -0.72
st 0.56% -16.06% 0.65% -16.62% 16.71%
2005 TFR 1.80 1.96 1.27 0.17 -0.69
st 8.43% -8.90% 6.99% -17.33% 15.89%
Table 2.4: Effects of Other Factors on TFR
TFR st dt
Benchmark 2.55 0.56% 19.76%
Rt+1 2.49 1.42% 19.76%
gt+1 2.21 4.85% 19.96%
gt 2.55 0.56% 19.96%
ft−1 2.55 0.57% 19.24%
Rtst−1 2.55 0.56% 19.57%
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Figure 2.11: Optimal Fertility Choice and Expected Social Insurance Tax Rate αt+1
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